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RELIGION, CUSTODY, AND A
CHILD'S IDENTITIES©
By SHAUNA VAN PRAAGH*
Custody decisionmaking in which religion plays a role is
significant from the perspective of parents, children,
religious communities, and the liberal diverse state.
Neither a family law analysis based on best interests,
nor a constitutional law analysis based on parental
rights, provides a wholly satisfactory response to the
task of delineating custody and access when religion is
at issue. Instead, a child's sense of identity, partly
defined through membership in religious communities,
must be considered; at the same time, the child's
integrity must be protected. By balancing a child's
interests of identity and integrity, courts respect
religious freedoms and custodial authority, and
acknowledge the realities of the lives of children of
interfaith families. The complex and multiple
affiliations of young individuals are thus recognized.
Les parents, les enfants, les communautes religieuses,
et l'ttat libral et pluraliste sont tous interpell6s par
une d6cision judiciaire sur la garde mettant en cause la
religion. Dans un tel cas, ni une analyse tir6e du droit
de la famille et centr6e sur le meilleur int6rt de
l'enfant ni une analyse articul6 autour des droits
constitutionnels des parents ne permettant d'6quilibrer
de mani~re satisfaisante la garde et l'acc~s, lorsque
l'616ment religion est pr6sent. Tout en prot6geant
l'int6grit de l'enfant, on doit plut6t se baser sur sa
perception de sa propre identit6, en partie moulee par
l'appartenance A une ou plusieurs communautds
religieuses. En combinant int6grit6 et identit, de
l'infant, les tribunaux respectent non seulement la
libert6 de religion et l'autorit6 du gardien, mais
6galement les r6alit6s complexes des enfants de
families mixtes. On donne ainsi effet aux filiations
multiples des jeunes personnes.
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Religion, Custody, and a Child's Identities
I. INTRODUCTION: WHY RELIGION AND CUSTODY?
Oh, it is the biggest mix-up
that you have ever seen
-my father, he was orange,
and me mother, she was green.
They were married in two churches
Lived happily enough
Until the day that I was born
And things got rather tough.1
The religion of mothers and fathers matters for children. The
identities of children are influenced by it and, indeed, can be defined
and shaped by it. Of course, parents may not share a religious faith and
background and this, too, has an impact on their children.. In general,
state law in a secular society is understood to play no role in the working
out of religious difference within the family. When parents with
different religions dispute the custody of their children, however, law is
often forced to pay attention. Courts may be called upon to consider
conflicting parental religious beliefs and practices in determining the
allocation of custody and the structuring of access.
Custody disputes in which religious beliefs and practices play a
role appear, at first, to constitute a tiny, case-specific, discrete area of
the law. A closer look at the issues at stake reveals a complicated
intersection of policies and processes: the best interests of children, the
scope of custody and access, the extent of individual freedom of religion,
and the significance of identity and group affiliation in a diverse society.
When religion is considered relevant by both the parents and the court
to custody decisionmaking, it is possible to glean insights as to the
relationships between parents and children, between state and religion,
and between children and their communities.
The question of religion in custody decisionmaking takes on
particular and growing significance in a society where intermarriage is
prevalent given the coexistence of many religions and cultures,2 and
1 A. Murphy, "The Orange and the Green," recorded by the Irish Rovers on The Best of The
Irish Rovers (New York: MCA Records, 1972).
2 See R. Wuthnow, The Restructuring of American Religion: Society and Faith since World War
II (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988) at 90 (in every major denomination, the
proportion of married people wedded to a spouse of the same religion is on the decline); J. Petsonk
& J. Remsen, The Intermarriage Handbook A Guide for Jews and Christians (New York: William
1997]
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where divorce plays a role in exposing the non-monolithic nature of
family life. Further, current dialogue regarding identity politics in legal
and social institutions emphasizes community affiliation in a way that
implicates children, their education, and the connections they forge as
they grow into adult citizens.3 Against this backdrop, the notion of
children's rights has gained support, complicated by an ongoing critique
and examination of rights themselves, both generally and in the specific
context of children.4 Finally, the appropriateness of the best interests
test for determining custody and post-separation/divorce life for children
continues to be questioned, and the meaning of custody and access
subject to ongoing scrutiny.5
An analysis of the case of religion in custody decisionmaking is
important, then, from the perspective of a number of parties. Parents
may keenly feel the responsibility and desire to pass on their beliefs and
religious identity to their children. Parents who do not share the same
beliefs and background may agree in the context of their partnership to
Morrow, 1991); M.E. Smith, "Relations between Church and State in the United States, with
Special Attention to the Schooling of Children" (1987) 35 Am. J. Comp. L. 1 (an overview of
religious pluralism and diversity in the United States gives the reader a sense of an "interfaith"
enterprise); M.A. Richard, Ethnic Groups and Marital Choice: Ethnic History and Marital
Assimilation in Canada, 1871 and 1971 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1991);
and P.R. Spickard, Mixed Blood. Intermarriage and Ethnic Identity in 20th Century America (Madison,
Wisc.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989). Statistical reports can give a precise picture of the
prevalence of interfaith marriage: see, for example, Statistics Canada, Marriages by Religious
Denomination of Groom and Bride, Canada, 1992 (Ottawa: Minister of Industry, Science &
Technology, 1995) at 84-212.
3 For a general introduction to this discussion, see W. Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and
Culture (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989); A. Gutmann, "Children, Paternalism and Education: A
Liberal Argument" (1980) 9 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 338; and D. Miller & M. Walzer, eds., Pluralism,
Justice and Equality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). See also D. Danielson & K. Engel,
eds., After Identity (New York: Routledge, 1995); and Commission des droits de la personne du
Qu6bec, Religious Pluralism in Quebec: A Social and Ethical Challenge by M. Rochon & P. Bosset
(Quebec: The Commission, 1995).
4 See generally P. Alston, S. Parker & J. Seymour, eds., Children, Rights and the Law (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1992); M. Freeman, ed., Children's Rights: A Comparative Perspective
(Aldershot, U.K.: Dartmouth, 1996); M. Minow, "Rights for the Next Generation: A Feminist
Approach to Children's Rights" (1986) 9 Harv. Women's L.J. 1 [hereinafter "Next Generation"];
and, as the overarching international indicator of a new emphasis on children's rights: Convention
on the Rights of the Child (With Reservations and Understandings), 20 November 1989, Can. T.S. 1992
No. 3 (entered into force on 2 September 1990) [hereinafter Rights of the Child].
5 See C.E. Schneider, "Religion and Child Custody" (1992) 25 U. Mich. J. Law Ref. 879 at 879
[hereinafter "Religion and Custody"], where he says, speaking within the U.S. context: "[Tjhese
problems [at the intersection of religion, law and the family] raise telling questions about the
tension between discretion and rules in law, about the discords between religion and law, about the
meaning of pluralism in American life, and about the usefulness of rights discourse in American
law." The problems have been present for a long time. See L.M. Friedman, "The Parental Right to
Control the Religious Education of a Child" (1916) 29 Harv. L. Rev. 485.
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raise their children in a certain way (whether one religion, both, or
none). In the context of divorce, each parent, whether entrusted with
custody or access, may articulate a "right" to share religious beliefs with
the children-a right that could be argued to extend to control over
religious upbringing and education. Generally left untouched in an
"intact" family, those perceived rights and the beliefs and practices to
which they apply are laid open to intervention in custody proceedings.
For the children involved, the treatment of religion in custody
decisionmaking reflects the court's perception of, and impact upon, their
identities and the ways in which those identities are developed and
nourished. Decisions based on best interests regarding which parent
retains custody, and to what extent that parent directs the religious
upbringing of the child and shares that responsibility with the access
parent, have ongoing implications for the child's sense of identity.
Further, decisions as to what constitutes harm for the purposes of
denying or limiting custody or access, indicate the court's willingness to
interfere to protect the integrity of children. It should be noted here
that my focus on religion in custody decisionmaking is not meant to
imply that a religious identity for children is necessary or desirable. But
children's affiliation through parents to a religious community does
implicate identity formation parallel to, yet distinct from, affiliation to
communities based on culture, ethnicity, language, or race.
Religious communities themselves also have a stake in a court's
approach to religion in custody decisionmaking. While not directly
represented as parties in court, communities may express their interests
through a parent or through expert evidence related to membership of
the child in the community. Whether modern, traditional, integrated or
insular, religious communities generally see the membership of the next
generation as crucial. Children therefore take on great significance,
although some communities take a more active role in "fighting" for
"their" children. Even for liberal religions or branches of a religion, the
acknowledgment of "losing" on intermarriage is counterbalanced by a
desire to "win" with respect to the children of those partnerships.6 From
the perspective of insular communities, for whom religion is a complete
way of life, it may be important not only to involve children in the
practices of the religion, but also to ward off interference from the
6 See, for example, Rabbi S. Seltzer, Intermarriage, Divorce and the Jewish Status of Children,
(New York: Horizon Institute of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, August 1981)
(context of North American Reform Jews); and Chief Rabbi J. Sacks, Will We Have Jewish
Grandchildren?: Jewish Continuity and How To Achieve It (Ilford, U.K.: Valentine Mitchell, 1994)
(English Jewish community as the context).
1997]
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outside, secular society (which may be represented by a non- or
differently-believing spouse).
Finally, the case of religion in custody decisionmaking carries
significance from the perspective of a liberal and diverse state.7 Most
obviously, the state bears responsibility for the protection of children
from serious harm and, in fulfilling that role in the context of custody,
may indicate what practices it finds unacceptable. The state's respect for
religious freedom, and its recognition of diverse normative ways of life
for both children and adults, are also at stake here.8 The approach
taken by courts in custody cases involving religion may shed light on the
extent to which parallel "jurisdictions" over family life, based on
religious norms, operate within the state. The state's general willingness
and ability to define terms of custody and access in the best interests of
the child are thrown into question when that may mean interfering with
religious doctrine and practice.
Custody decisions involving religion are clearly case- and
situation-specific, and seem to defy general guidelines or legal tests.
Rather than attempt to offer such guidelines, this paper examines the
broad overlapping themes suggested by the interests outlined above,
with an emphasis on Canada. The Supreme Court of Canada recently
handed down judgments relating to religion and custody,9 and
underlying the arguments addressed by the Court is the broad and, as yet
largely untouched, question of the impact of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedomsl0 on the family. In treating the issues raised by the
appeals, the Court had the opportunity to offer guidance not only on the
application of the "best interests test" in custody matters, but also on the
7 See S. Van Praagh, "La diversit6 des enfants: un defi pour l'ttat pluraliste" (1994) 4 Revue
Lekton 155 [hereinafter "La diversit6", for a discussion of the challenges faced by the liberal
pluralist state, and embodied in religion and custody disputes.
8 1 acknowledge the conservative or fundamentalist agenda attached in contemporary North
American politics to religion, the family, and the combination of the two. I also recognize recent
attempts to "reclaim" that ground from a liberal perspective, see S.L. Carter, Comment: "The
Resurrection of Religious Freedom?" (1993) 107 Harv. L Rev. 118; and S.L. Carter, The Culture of
Disbelief. How Americal Law and Politics Trivialize Religious Devotion (New York: Anchor Books,
1994) [hereinafter Culture of Disbelief]. While I do not intend to enter the fray as such, I do wish to
resist explicitly the conservative agenda at the same time that I find it important to realize the
significance of religion and religious norms for many individuals and families.
9 Young v. Young [1993] 4 S.C.R. 3 [hereinafter Young], affg (1990), 50 B.C.L.R. (2d) 1 (C.A.),
rev'g (1989), 2 R.F.L. (2d) 193 (B.C.S.C.); and P.(D.) v. S.(C.), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 141 [hereinafter
P.(D.)], affg Droit de la Famille-1150, [1991] R.J.Q. 306 (C.A.) [hereinafter Famille-1150], aff'g
[1988] R.D.F. 40 (Que. C.S.).
10 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982,
c. 11 [hereinafter Charter].
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extent of and limitations on the Charter's guarantee of freedom of
religion. Further, it had before it an invitation to comment on, or at
least demonstrate an appreciation of, the identities of children in a
multicultural country.
The challenge in Canada stemmed from two similar cases,
Young11 from British Columbia, and P. (D.)12 from Quebec, in which the
trial judge curtailed the extent to which a Jehovah's Witness father could
share his religion during periods of access.13 The restrictions imposed
ranged from not being allowed to discuss his religious beliefs to being
prohibited from taking children to meetings or door-to-door during
proselytization efforts. On appeal, the British Columbia Court of
Appeal applied the Charter and removed the restrictions as unjustified
violations of the father's freedom of religion; the Quebec Court of
Appeal upheld the restrictions as justified on the basis of the negative
impact of the father's actions on the child.14 The Supreme Court of
Canada confirmed the contradictory decisions of both courts of appeal.
In a set of somewhat confused opinions, it left unresolved questions and
concerns about best interests, the interaction of the Charter and the
family, and the significance of group affiliation in decisionmaking that
affects the lives of parents and children. The contours of the Supreme
11 Supra note 9.
12 Supra note 9. Droit de la Famille-l50 was the style of cause of the case on appeal to the
Supreme Court of Canada, in keeping with the fact that family law cases in Quebec are referred to
by number. The reports of the Supreme Court decision refer to the initials of the parties.
13 The Jehovah's Witnesses recently took centre stage in challenging the ways in which
religion has played a role in custody decisionmaking. They were instrumental in bringing appeals to
the Supreme Court of Canada, arguing that the best interests test masks the personal bias of judges
and operates to the disadvantage of non-mainstream religions and, further, that any directions by a
trial judge restricting a parent with visitation rights from sharing his religious beliefs and practices
with his child should be struck down as a violation of religious freedom. In the same year, the
European Court of Human Rights ruled that an Austrian mother, refused custody by a domestic
court on the basis of her beliefs and practices as a Jehovah's Witness, had been denied her right to
respect for family life guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights: Hoffman v.
Austria (1993), E.H.R.R. 293 [hereinafter Hoffman]. While the analysis here does not extend
explicitly to European Convention law, the case indicates the need for consideration of the issues in
multiple jurisdictions. The central role of the Jehovah's Witnesses in religion and family matters
continued in Canada, albeit in the context of child protection. See B. (R.) v. Children's Aid Society of
Metropolitan Toronto, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 315.
14 This divergence mirrors the general split among provincial courts of appeal in their
approaches to the impact of freedom of religion, guaranteed by the Charter, on custody decisions
involving religious beliefs and practices. See J.T. Syrtash, Religion and Culture in Canadian Family
Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 1992) at 7-49 [hereinafter Religion and Culture]. The divergence can
also be partly explained by the husband's undertaking, during the trial in Young, not to proselytize,
so the court did not feel it necessary to impose this condition. See part III(B)(2), below.
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Court of Canada cases 5 provide a contextual background against which
to articulate the issues raised by the case of religion in custody
decisionmaking.
At a time when Canadian constitutional law is introducing itself
on a number of fronts to a previously "Charter-free family," it is helpful
to consider to some extent both an analysis that underlines the
constitutionally entrenched rights of the adults involved and one that
does not provide such explicit guarantees. In the analysis to follow, I
therefore use examples from the United States and England, as well as
Canada, partly to illustrate how courts approach the issues in countries
with similar custody law, but with very different religion-state structures
and rights-guaranteeing mechanisms. I will not present a complete
overview or comparison of the law in the three countries,16 but rather
15 For comments written specifically on the decisions, see MJ Bailey, "Custody, Access, and
Religion: A Comment on Young v. Young and D.P. v. C.S." (1994) 11 C.F.L.Q. 319; and W.G. How,
Case Comment "Young v. Young and D.P. v. C.S.: Custody and Access-The Supreme Court
Compounds Confusion" (1994) 11 C.F.L.Q. 109.
16 For a comparative analysis of decisions and approaches in Canada, Great Britain, Australia,
the United States, France and Italy, see D.L. Goldberg & C. Tempesta, The Impact of Religion on
Custody and Access Disputes: A Comparative Analysis (Toronto: Office of the Official Guardian,
Ministry of the Attorney General of Ontario, 1994).
In the United States see, for example, D.L. Beschle, "God Bless the Child?: The Use of
Religion as a Factor in Child Custody and Adoption Proceedings" (1989) 58 Fordham L. Rev. 383;
Note, "The Establishment Clause and Religion in Child Custody Disputes: Factoring Religion into
the Best Interest Equation" (1984) 82 Mich. L. Rev. 1702 [hereinafter "Establishment Clause"];
J.M. Fitzgerald, "An Overview of Religious Considerations in Child Custody Disputes" (1989) 32
Catholic Lawyer 129; R.A. White, Note, "Divorce: Restricting Religious Activity During Visitation"
(1985) 38 Okla. L. Rev. 284; R.C. Mangrum, "Exclusive Reliance on Best Interest May be
Unconstitutional: Religion as a Factor in Child Custody Cases" (1981) 15 Creighton L. Rev. 25; J.C.
Paul, "You Get the House. I Get the Car. You Get the Kids. I Get Their Souls-The Impact of
Spiritual Custody Awards on the Free Exercise Rights of Custodial Parents" (1989) 138 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 583; S.M. Zarowny, Note "The Religious Upbringing of Children After Divorce" (1980) 56
Notre Dame Lawyer 160; and "Religion and Custody," supra note 5.
In Canada see, for example, Religion and Culture, supra note 14; J. Mucci, "The Effect of
Religious Beliefs in Child Custody Disputes" (1986) 5 Can. J. Fam. L. 353; F. Zemans, "Cultural
Diversity in Custody Disputes" in R. Abella & C. L'Heureux-Dub16, eds., Family Law, Dimensions of
Justice (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983) 137; V. Toselli, "Religion in Custody Disputes" (1990) 25
R.F.L. (3d) 261; S.J. Toope, "Riding the Fences: Courts, Charter Rights and Family Law" (1991), 9
Can. J. Farn. L. 55 [hereinafter "Riding the Fences"]; S. Toope, Book Review of Religion and
Culture in Canadian Family Law by J.T. Syrtash (1993) 71 Can. Bar. Rev. 769; S. Van Praagh,
"Bringing the Charter Home," Book Review of Religion and Culture in Canadian Family Law by J.T.
Syrtash (1993) 38 McGill L.J. 233 [hereinafter "Bringing the Charter Home"]; and C. Davies,
"Racial and Cultural Issues in Custody Matters" (1994) 10 C.F.L.Q. 1 [hereinafter "Racial and
Cultural Issues"].
In England see, for example, B. Walsh, "Religious Considerations in Custody Disputes"[1988]
18 Fain. L. 198; C. Hamilton, Children and Religion (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1994). See more
generally B. Hoggett & D. Pearl, The Family, Law and Society: Cases and Materials (London:
Butterworths, 1991) c. 10; and S. Cretney & J. Masson, Principles of Family Law (London: Sweet &
316
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will draw on examples to illustrate general observations and concerns.
The three countries share basic tenets about the responsibility of secular
courts in determining the best interests of children without favouring
one set of religious beliefs and practices over another. However, when
the analysis shifts beyond the allocation of custody to the interplay of
conflicting beliefs and practices in the life of the child, the language used
to describe the interests involved differs as does the approach taken by
the courts.
In Part II of this article, I introduce the general issues
surrounding the consideration and treatment of religion in the allocation
and scope of custody. These include the entanglement and possible bias
implied by a court's involvement in questions of religious belief and
practice, and the dynamics of gender in the resolution of claims
regarding religious upbringing of children. I then examine the two
predominant characterizations of the issue of religion in custody
decisionmaking and the arguments and problems related to each. As a
family law issue, a strong claim can be made on behalf of the custodial
parent and his or her control over religious upbringing; at the same time,
the malleability of the best interests test is brought to light. As an issue
of constitutional law, on the other hand, a claim of some authority over
the upbringing of children can be made on behalf of an access parent,
understood to be an individual holder of freedom of religion. I suggest
that neither approach works in the way it appears to initially, and refuse
to make a simple choice between the two.
In Part III, I consider alternative frameworks for approaching
religion and custody. The recognition of pluralism and of the reality and
principle of multiculturalism, leads to a consideration of the issue as one
of child membership in coexisting religious communities. Finally,
relevant claims can be made in the form of children's rights, whether
understood to encourage participation in decisionmaking or to inform
children's religious affiliations. I attempt to underline the problems and
potential associated with each characterization in order to investigate
more fruitfully the "best interests" analysis offered by the Supreme
Court of Canada.
Elements of the four frameworks derived from family law,
constitutional freedoms, coexisting communities, and children's rights,
inform an analysis based on children's identities and integrity and the
interaction between the two. As sketched in Part IV, the affiliations of
children must be taken seriously at the same time that the protection of
children-whether physical, emotional or psychological-remains
crucial. This analysis may offer guidelines to courts in their exercise of
Maxwell, 1990) c. 24.
1997]
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responsibility in cases involving religion and custody disputes, and, more
generally, in cases involving the family and the Charter. I conclude by
drawing attention to the fact that children of differently believing
parents can help to show the interplay among groups in a diverse state,
as well as the potential for individuals to live with overlapping
attachments to both other communities and other people.
II. CHARACTERIZING THE CASE OF RELIGION
AND CUSTODY
A. Religion in Judicial Decisionmaking
Courts may consider the religious beliefs and practices of parents
in a custody dispute for one of two general reasons: first, the secular
effects of those beliefs and practices may be factored into the best
interests equation in order to determine which parent retains custody of
the child; and second, they may be referred to in order to impose limits
on the behaviour of the non-custodial parent during access, or indeed,
on the custodial parent. It is important to note that, in both of these
areas of decisionmaking, courts do not understand themselves to judge
the content and value of particular religious beliefs. Whether in the
United States, England, or Canada, directly delving into theology and
doctrine in order to assess the merits -of a given set of beliefs and
practices is strictly beyond the jurisdiction of secular courts.17 This is not
to say, however, that courts refrain from examining religious practices in
17 By singling out these three countries, I am not, of course, suggesting that these are the only
jurisdictions in which this is the case. In England, see In re J.M. Carroll (An Infant), [1931] 1 K.B.
317 at 336 (C.A.), where Scrutton L.J. states "It is, I hope, unnecessary to say that the court is
perfectly impartial in matters of religion for the reason that it has as a court no evidence, no
knowledge, no views as to the respective merits of religious views of various denominations." In
Canada, see Chaput v. Romain, [1955] S.C.R. 834, for a similar statement. American jurisprudence
is replete with examples of the same idea, anchored by the First Amendment's anti-establishment
clause. See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871); and Presbyterian Church in the United
States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 601 (1969). In a more
recent custody context, see Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) [hereinafter
Zummo], in which the court provides an overview of the attitude and responsibility of American
courts with respect to religious questions, especially in the context of the family.
While the explicit assessment of religious doctrine may be off-limits, this does not mean that
courts have not expressed clear evaluations of particular religious sects, cults, beliefs, and practices.
Indeed, particularly in these and other Western societies, law has played a role in reinforcing what
might be seen as a hierarchy of religions-ranging from organized "Judeo-Christian" belief systems,
to "new-age" cults.
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the guise of the behaviour of the individual parent. Neither is it to say
that a judgment rendered on the basis of the child's best interests does
not carry with it an implied assessment of the religion in question.
Here, then, we find one of the major concerns of religious
individuals and communities, and of commentators worried about the
bias of trial judges and the entanglement of secular law and religious
doctrine.18 The context of divorce hands courts the opportunity to
"save" children from what judges may deem a fanatic, exclusionary, far-
from-mainstream, religious upbringing, or, at the other extreme, from a
non-religious and thus deemed amoral or immoral upbringing.1 9 The
fact that the respect accorded trial judges is especially great in custody
disputes where the particular facts are extremely significant, and
therefore that appeals are rare, contributes to the fear that courts may
exercise their power in a discriminatory and impermissibly
interventionist manner.
1. Allocating and setting the scope of custody
With respect to the court's decision as to which parent retains
custody,2 0 the question arises as to whether it is ever permissible to
18 Good examples of commentators who focus on this concern include Syrtash in Religion and
Culture, supra note 14; and Mangrum, supra note 16.
19 As Bernadette Walsh points out, supra note 16 at 198, custody is not any longer so much
about the soul of a child as it is about the child's body [emphasis added].
20 For the purposes of this discussion, I assume a post-divorce arrangement whereby one
parent is granted custody of the children, while the other may have access to the children, according
to court-specified terms. It must be acknowledged, of course, that this is neither the only possible
arrangement, nor the only type of arrangement ordered by courts. For example, joint custody may
be ordered, although joint legal custody, as opposed to joint physical custody, looks very much like
the arrangement described above. See A. Harvison Young, "Joint Custody as Norm: Solomon
Revisited" (1994) 32 Osgoode Hall L.J. 785. Further, the terms custody and access are far from
universal-for example, in England, both parents (and potentially others) may have parental
responsibility, while only one has a "residence order." The Civil Code of Quebec (cco) specifies that
parents have parental authority regardless of whether children physically live with them or not (see
arts. 513, 598, and 605 cco and the following paragraphs of this footnote). However, the reality for
most post-divorce families is that children are in the physical custody of one parent. See E.E.
Maccoby & R.H. Mnookin, Dividing the Child (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994).
A note about the law and legal terms in Quebec is warranted here, particularly in light of the
fact that one of the appeals to the Supreme Court of Canada comes from Quebec. What is known
as legal custody in common law jurisdictions is referred to as parental authority in the civil law.
Parental authority is exercised jointly by both parents (art. 600 cco) and consists of the rights and
duties of custody, supervision, education and maintenance of their children (art. 599 cco). See C.
Bernard, R. Ward & B.M. Knoppers, "'Best Interests' of the Child Exposed: A Portrait of Qu6bec
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consider parental behaviour derived from religious belief in the
determination of a child's best interests. While an overt preference for
religion over atheism is a thing of the past,2 1 even American courts,
explicitly constrained by the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment, 2 2 include the impact of parental religious belief on
children's spiritual well-being in the best interests matrix. It is significant
that, while earlier in this century the worry was that courts were overly
supportive of religious upbringing in general, this has shifted to a
critique based on the court's comparison of religious practices and its
negative approach to religious upbringing in small, insulated, extremist
communities.2 3 The threshold, however, for denying custody as a direct
When custody is awarded to one parent, the content of the rights of the non-custodial parent is
automatically affected. A person with parental authority who loses the right of custody is not
deprived of all the attributes of parental authority: C.(G.) v. V-.F. (T.), [1978] 2 S.C.R. 244.
However, the custodial parent has the right to live with, to supervise, and to make daily decisions for
the child, which means that some decisions will be made by the custodial parent alone. Thus, while
the non-custodial parent continues to be the holder of parental authority, she ceases to participate
fully in its exercise (Droit de la famille-301, [1988] R.J.Q. 17 at 21 (C.A.)). The non-custodial
parent continues to exercise other rights over the child which include the right to make decisions for
the child when the child is with her and the right to be consulted about decisions made by the
custodial parent, such as those concerning education and medical treatment (art. 605 cco): see M.
Pratte, "La garde conjointe des enfants de families d6sunies" (1988) 19 R.G.D. 525 at 565. The
non-custodial parent is also permitted to supervise the custodial parent's decisions with regard to
the child. This is intended to serve as compensation for the loss of custody. If the non-custodial
parent disagrees with a decision made by the custodial parent, she may refer the matter to the court,
which will decide the matter in the best interests of the child (art. 604 cco): see S. Guillet, "Les
conventions de rupture du lien matrimonial et la garde des enfants" (1992) 2 C.P. du N. 193 at 206;
and Droit de la Famille-1286, [1989] R.D.F. 657 (Que. C.S.).
21 In the adoption context, especially, it was at one time urged upon would-be adoptive
parents that they profess some religious faith. See L Pfeffer, God, Caesar and the Constitution." The
Court as Referee of Church-State Confrontation (Boston: Beacon, 1975) e. 3 [hereinafter God and
Constitution]. See generally M.G. Paulsen, "Constitutional Problems of Utilizing a Religious Factor
in Adoptions and Placements of Children" in D.H. Oaks, ed., The Wall Between Church and State
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963) 117. In custody cases, a "moral" upbringing is still
generally considered in the child's best interests and it has been suggested that religion may be
considered relevant to moral welfare only if broadly defined. See Beschle, supra note 16 at 417-19.
22 U.S. Const, amend I states in part: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." For an articulation of concerns
about considering religion in custody disputes in light of the Establishment Clause, see Note, "The
Establishment Clause and Religion in Child Custody Disputes: Factoring Religion into the Best
Interest Equation" (1984) 82 Mich. L Rev. 1702.
23 In Canada, see Religion and Culture, supra note 14, c. 1, which provides an overview of
traditional approaches and recent changes with respect to the treatment of religion in Canadian
custody disputes. Syrtash summarizes the chapter, at 87, with the observation that courts display a
"prejudice against those religions that encompass an entire way of life." See also the discussion in
"Riding the Fences," supra note 16 at 80-83, of Droit de lafamille-239, [1985] C.S. 1106, a case in
which custody was changed to the more "tolerant" father because of the mother's new adherence to
a rigourous, religious life.
However, in "Religion and Custody," supra note 5, Schneider points out, at 891-92, that in the
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result of a parent's religious practices and teachings is generally high in
the sense that substantial harm or threat of harm to the child must be
present.24
Arguments that religion not be taken into account in the court's
consideration of best interests when choosing a custodial parent
generally have not been successful. Indeed, the court's task of
considering all factors relevant to the children involved seems to
preclude such arguments. We are left then with a situation whereby
judges may make decisions regarding the harmful nature -of parental
religious beliefs and practices, and where the exercise of such discretion
is not characterized as impermissible preference. 25
The question as to whether and to what extent courts may dictate
the scope and content of custody and access in light of parental religious
practices poses additional difficulties. Traditionally, the custodial parent
has had control over the religious upbringing and education of the child.
The controversy arises with respdct to religion when further explicit
limitations are placed on the access parent's practices, on the basis of the
child's best interests. 2 6 Courts focus on the conflict between the
particular parents in the custody cases before them rather than on any
United States, "[W]e ought not over-dramatize the danger that judges may lack sympathy for the
heterodox religions these cases involve.... [T]here is much more substantial evidence [in U.S.
apellate court decisions] that courts have been aware of just that danger and have leaned over
backwards to avoid it."
24 In the United States, the often-cited cases of Quiner v. Quiner, 59 Cal. Rptr. 503 (1967 Ct.
App.) [hereinafter Quiner]; and Burnham v. Burnham, 304 N.W.2d 58 (Neb. 1981) [hereinafter
Burnham], give a general picture of the "tolerance" of courts and indicate, with relatively dramatic
fact scenarios, different perspectives on the impact of parental religion on children. See the
discussion in Part II(B)(2), below. In England, the Children Act 1989 (U.K.), 1989, c. 41, setting out
the factors to be considered with respect to best interests, does not mention religion per se but case
law suggests that it may be included. See, for example, Re B. and G. (Minors), [1985] 1 F.L.R. 134
(Fain. Div.) [hereinafter Re B & G]; and Re T (Minors), [1981] 2 F.L.R. 239 (C.A.). In Canada, the
effect of religious beliefs and practices may be considered in deciding custody. The degree of harm
required for denying or switching custody was the focus of dispute prior to the Supreme Court
cases, and arguably remains so. See, for example, "Riding the Fences," supra note 16 at 80-85;
Mucci, supra note 16; and Religion and Culture, supra note 14 at 1-49 (overview of Canadian case
law).
25 At least one commentator suggests that preference may be acceptable but that a pretense of
neutrality with respect to modes of childrearing is not: Mucci, supra note 16. The articulation of
reasons for choices may indeed be desirable but explicit preference of one religion over another by
courts is highly problematic and, moreover, likely unconstitutional in the Canadian context.
26 A variety of commentators focus on this type of situation: see Paul, supra note 16; Religion
and Culture, supra note 14; and "Riding the Fences," supra note 16. This is, of course, exemplified
by the recent Supreme Court of Canada cases. The religious significance often attached to one day
or another of the weekend means that the problem of limitations on access (which often takes place
on weekends) is exacerbated. In addition, school vacation periods often include religious holidays
and are often spent with the access parent. See Beschle, supra note 16 at 403.
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general conflict between religious doctrines per se.
Beyond expressing general concern over the impact of different
parental teachings or perspectives, courts may be confronted with
situations where one parent tells the children, based on his or her
religious beliefs, that the other, non-believing parent is evil or going
straight to hell or seriously misguided.2 7 Courts may read this as
deliberately damaging to a relationship, the preservation of which is in
the child's best interests, and will attempt to limit such behaviour
accordingly. Alternatively, courts may find the religious practices of one
parent harmful in themselves and may order restrictions on the
children's involvement in those practices, without reference to conflict or
tension between the parents.28 The general issue to be resolved in all
these cases (which include Young and P. (D.)) is whether and on what
grounds courts may make orders setting terms of custody and access with
direct reference to religious practice.
2. The gender dimension
In order to fill out this preliminary sketch of the general issues
invoked by religion and custody, an acknowledgement of the gender
dynamics at play is required. Although ignored to a large extent in the
literature focusing primarily on religion in custody decisionmaking, the
way in which gender plays a general role in custody law clearly intersects
with the issues raised in this specific context.2 9 In the case of allocation
of custody, a major concern from a feminist perspective stems from the
possibility that the impact of non-mainstream or
"eccentric"/'.'strange"/"different" religious beliefs and practices may be
exaggerated in order to deny custody to an otherwise capable mother
2 7 See Toselli, supra note 16 at 271 and the cases to which he refers: Sullivan v. Fox (1984), 38
R.F.L. (2d) 293 (P.E.I.S.C.) (importance of open communication between parents); and Gunn v.
Gunn (1975), 24 R.F.L. 182 (P.E.I.S.C.) (father's adverse comments about mother's "ill repute").
Such behaviour is, of course, not specific to religious matters.
28 Toselli distinguishes between "direct" harm, usually confined to cases involving "fringe
religions" in which specific religious practices are themselves deemed harmful, and "indirect" harm
which is deemed to arise from the clash of religious beliefs.
29 For examples of the literature that investigates and illustrates the gender bias in custody
and its negative impact on mothers see M.A. Fineman, The Illusion of Equality-The Rhetoric and
Reality of Divorce Reform (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991) [hereinafter Illusion of
Equality]; C. Smart & S. Sevenhuijsen, eds., Child Custody and the Politics of Gender (New York:
Routledge, 1990); P. Chesler, Mothers on Trial: The Battle for Children and Custody (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1985); and M. Minow, "Forming Underneath Everything That Grows: Toward a
History of Family Law" [1985] Wisc. L. Rev. 1803 [hereinafter "History of Family Law"].
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who, indeed, may have been primarily responsible for childcare during
the marriage. Essentially, this concern forces the realization that
religion, if included in the tallying-up of factors relevant to the best
interests of children, may be used (like other factors) to question
custodial ability and responsibility. This is a concern unspecific to the
issue of religion, but the contours of religious freedom may provide
specialized arguments on behalf of a mother claiming custody.30
It is with respect to the case of setting the scope of custody and
access, however, that the dimension of gender deserves careful
consideration. It appears that many or most of the cases in which
religion is raised as a relevant factor are those where a father attempts to
expand his rights to access. If a court understands recognition of the
father's freedom of religion to preclude any limits on his sharing of
religious practices with his children, significant potential exists for
restrictions on the custodial mother's lifestyle, way of caring for her
children, and indeed her own freedom. It is possible that the gender
dimension of this problem is simply a product of the fact that, in most
cases, it is mothers who are the custodial parents after divorce. On the
other hand, the willingness to emphasize a father's right to religious
freedom at the expense of a custodial mother's authority justifies special
attention from a feminist perspective.31 In the discussion to follow, the
gender implications of an analysis of religion and custody are
acknowledged;32 however, I attempt to broaden the spectrum of issues at
30 For example, the Hoffman case, supra note 13, recognizes the violation of the rights of a
Jehovah's Witness mother denied custody on the basis of her religion.
31 See "Bringing the Charter Home," supra note 16 at 237-239, where I voice these concerns in
reviewing Religion and Culture, supra note 14; and the author's passing recognition, at 68, that those
"concerned with women's issues" may be alarmed at the erosion of custodial rights (which he sees as
implicit in the protection of religious freedom and multiculturalism). In Canada, where the
Supreme Court appeals were both cases of fathers demanding, on the basis of freedom of religion,
an end to restrictions on their behaviour with their children during periods of access, a gender
dimension might well have been expected in the Court's response. Indeed, Justice L'Heureux-Dub6
does engage in an in-depth discussion of the reality of custody and the fact that women are
disproportionately responsible for the actual care for and control over children, and she was
especially sensitive to the resulting impact that religious freedom claims may have on custodial
mothers: Young, supra note 9 at 49-52.
32 Susan Boyd presented a paper at the annual meeting of the Canadian Law and Society
Association in June 1993, in Ottawa, in which she pointed to cases of religion in custody and access
as examples of situations in which the "best interests" of children are being used to further "fathers'
rights" at the expense of custodial mothers. The arguments she raised in this presentation are the
substance of an article entitled "Is There an Ideology of Motherhood in (Post) Modern Child
Custody Law?" (1996) 5 Soc. & Legal Stud. 495. Her work in the area of religion and custody thus
has explicit links with her past work. See, for example, S.B. Boyd, "Potentialities and Perils of the
Primary Caregiver Presumption" (1990) 7 C.F.L.Q. 1 [hereinafter "Potentialities"]; and "Some
19971
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stake and, in doing so, to consider seriously claims of freedom of religion
in a context involving children of interfaith partnerships. The gender
dimension of the issues does, however, highlight the fact that it is usually
custody at stake when mothers claim religious freedom, while
participation through access is more often at stake when that freedom is
argued by fathers.
B. Family Law vs. Constitutional Law
Family law and constitutional law offer the two predominant
models for approaching the question of religion in custody
decisionmaking and, indeed, the two models could be seen battling each
other before the Supreme Court of Canada. Here, I attempt to examine
the fullest claims that can be made by the parties in each context, the
particular problems raised, and the implications of adopting either
approach in its entirety. At first glance it might seem that disputes over
religion in custody and access are simplified if framed as an issue of
family law. Without the added complication of constitutionally
guaranteed parental freedoms, the best interests of the child retain top
priority and can be determined in a fairly straightforward manner. A
second glance uncovers the misleading nature of such assumptions.
While it is true that, in Canada, religion and culture in custody
decisionmaking have received renewed attention as a result of
speculation on the Charter's application to family law in general, the
Charter merely complicates the analysis, rather than creating some new
issue. Indeed, case law and commentary in both England and
pre-Charter Canada indicate that approaching the issues in family law is
no less sensitive than is the case in the United States, where they have
long been linked to constitutional concerns.
1. An issue of family law: best interests
and the scope of parental control
As already noted, the two major questions associated with
religion and custody decisionmaking are, first, the appropriate standard
for allocating custody, and, second, the scope of custodial authority over
the upbringing of children. With respect to the first, the example of
Postmodernist Challenges to Feminist Analyses of Law, Family and State: Ideology and Discourse
in Child Custody Law" (1991) 10 Can. J. Fam. L. 79. See also Bailey, supra note 15 at 336-41, where
Justice L'Heureux-Dub6's treatment of this issue in Young is summarized.
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religion underlines the difficulty with a supposedly "objective" best
interests of children test.33 The vague, indeterminate nature of that
test,34 the interplay of the judge's notions of childrearing with the
evidence presented as to the lifestyles of both parents, the devaluation of
pre-divorce care arrangements35 and the increasing reliance on highly
manipulable and value-laden social sciences and psychological data and
opinions, 36 are not only present, but exaggerated in the context of
religion.3 7
With respect to the second question, that of the scope of custody,
it is traditionally the parent with custody who controls major aspects of
the child's upbringing, including religious education and training. It is
this parent who has general authority over which school the children
attend and which extra-curricular activities they engage in. Further, the
law has contemplated the custodial parent passing on religious beliefs to
children and involving them in religious practices, and this has been
33 Various alternatives to the best interests test have been discussed in the literature, ranging
from a primary caregiver principle to presumptive joint custody, to the replication of a pre-divorce
pattern of sharing responsibility. See generally Smart & Sevenhuijsen, eds., supra note 29; Maccoby
& Mnookin, supra note 20; Illusion of Equality, supra note 29; and "Potentialities," supra note 32.
For the purposes of this discussion, I assume that the "best interests" test is here to stay for the
immediate future.
34 See, for example, R.H. Mnookin, "Child Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the
Face of Indeterminacy" (1975) 39 Law & Contemp. Probs. 226.
35 See, for example, E. Scott, "Pluralism, Parental Preference and Child Custody" (1992) 80
Cal. L Rev. 615.
36 See, for example, M.A. Fineman, "Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal
Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking" (1988) 101 Harv. L. Rev. 727; and Illusion of Equality,
supra note 29, c. 7.
37 English courts, for example, have switched custody from one parent to another based on the
"handicapping" aspects of an upbringing within the Exclusive Brethren community (Hewison v.
Hewison (1977) 7 Fam. L. 207 (C.A.)) on a custodial mother's isolation of the child from the father
and other social life in general (T. v. T (1974) 4 Fam. L. 190 (C.A.)), and on the "immoral, socially
obnoxious, corrupt, sinister, dangerous" beliefs and practices of the Church of Scientology to which
the previously custodial father belonged (Re B & G, supra note 24). On the other hand, a
"moderate" Jehovah's Witness mother, willing to let her son spend Christmas with his father, was
allowed to retain custody (Re H. (A Minor), [1980] 2 F.LR. 253 (Fain. Div.)). Such determinations
are justified by the court's consideration of the best interests of children and its responsibility to
shield them from harm and yet they indicate the degree of discretionary power that courts hold and
exercise (see the list of factors in section 1(3) of the Children Act 1989, supra note 24). The rejection
of "parental rights" in favour of "best interests," marked by the landmark case of J. v. C., [1970]
A.C. 668 (H.L) (in which poor, Spanish, Catholic parents lost their child to better-off, English,
Anglican foster parents) has not brought predictability. In light of evidence with respect to religious
beliefs and practices, the strongest claim a parent may make for custody is one indicating suitability
regardless of religion and, further, the non-harmful nature of the specific mode of childrearing
under scrutiny.
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considered to be in the interests of the spiritual well-being of those
children 38
Such an understanding of the scope of custody indicates that the
parent without custody lacks authority over religious upbringing and
therefore that his relationship with the children is limited in this
significant way. Further, any conflict between the parents over the
religious development and identification of the children would be
resolved in favour of the custodial parent, so as to ensure some stability
in post-divorce day-to-day life. Indeed, such restrictions on the non-
custodial parent's control generally have been deemed to be in the best
interests of children 3 9 Thus, from the perspective of the custodial
parent who wants to avoid interference and disruption caused by the
other parent's desire to pass on religious beliefs and practices, an
approach emphasizing the traditional definition of custody in family law
would seem advisable.
Characterizing the issue as one of family law and turning to
dominant family law principles for answers carries both advantages and
drawbacks, however, even for the custodial parent. Contemporary
trends in custody decisionmaking focus on the benefits to children of
maintaining a strong relationship with both parents after divorce.4 0
While this sentiment has resulted in an increase in ordered joint custody
arrangements in some jurisdictions, 41 it is apparent even in situations
where parents continue to be allocated custodial and visitation roles.
Labelled, and welcomed, as an "erosion" of custody by some
38 A case reported by the English media seems to contradict this general framework. An
unmarried Muslim father succeeded in bringing a temporary injunction against the christening of
his five-month old daughter. The parents had separated and the Anglican mother had taken
responsibility for the care and upbringing of the child: "Court to Rule on Baptism" The
[LondonjIndependent (24 July 1993) 6. The suit was later dropped by the father "after taking legal
advice." See "Mother Wins Baptism Battle:' The [London] Daily Mail (19 April 1994) 24.
39 Syrtash in Religion and Culture, supra note 14 at 7-9, describes this as the "traditional"
approach to the question of the scope of access.
40 See, for example, J.S. Wallerstein & T.B. Kelly, Surviving the Breakup: How Children and
Parents Cope with Divorce (London: Grant McIntyre 1980), on the benefits to children of a post-
divorce relationship with fathers. See also B.M. Hoggett & D.S. Pearl, The Family Law and Society
3d ed. (London: Butterworths, 1991) c. 12; J.B. Kelly, "Children's Post-Divorce
Adjustment-Effects of Conflict, Parent Adjustment and Custody Arrangement" (1991) 21 Fam. L.
52; A. Bainham, "Legislation: The Privatisation of the Public Interest in Children" (1990) 53 Mod.
L. Rev. 206 at 217-20; E. Walsh, "The Wallerstein Experience" (1991) 21 Fam. L. 49; M.P.M.
Richards, "Post Divorce Arrangements for Children: A Psychological Perspective" (1982) J. Soc.
Welfare L. 133; and S. Maidment, "Access Conditions in Custody Orders" (1975) 2 Brit. J. L. &
Soc'y 182.
41 See, for example, Harvison Young, supra note 20.
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commentators,42 the phenomenon challenges long-held understandings
of the scope of custody and may indeed lead to new restrictions on the
custodial parent, again all in the best interests of children. That is, if
each parent is seen as an individual whose two-way relationship with
each child may begin pre-divorce but continues as fully as possible post-
divorce, then it becomes clear that the full exercise of custodial authority
and responsibility is laid open to challenge. 43
In keeping with the Children Act 1989, English law now
recognizes the full exercise of parental responsibility and authority by
each adult holding such responsibility, whether during custody or
visitation.44 This approach may be somewhat idealistic or impractical in
that it assumes a great deal as to the parents' ability to agree to and
create a post-divorce regimen in the interests of their children, but, in
theory, it contemplates an "equal" holding of responsibility and
authority. Rather than always working to the benefit of the custodial
parent, therefore, the dependency of the family law model on a flexible
"best interests of the child" standard may instead signal, on the one
hand, an increase in judicial interference with parental religious practice
in the context of custody allocation, and, on the other, a narrowing of the
scope of custody itself.45 It would seem that, if the access parent is
understood as having full parental responsibility and authority during
periods of access (derived from the best interests of the child), the
removal of any restrictions on that parent is called for. In Canada, the
legislative provision motivated by similar assumptions is section 16(10)
of the Divorce Act,4 6 which, completely apart from Charter
considerations, mandates that a court, in making an order with respect
4 2 Religion and Culture, supra note 14 at 68-72.
43 See A. Bainham, Case Comment: "Religion, Human Rights and the Fitness of Parents"
(1994) 53 Camb. L.J. 39. Bainham suggests that England may now, under the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 1950, Eur. T.S. No. 5
[hereinafter EcUR], turn to the language of "rights" observable in post-Charter Canada.
44 See the Children Act 1989, supra note 24, ss. 2(5)-(11). Note that the terms of custody and
access are no longer used in England; rather an adult may have a residence order in her favour
(similar to custody, whereby the child lives with that person), or may have a contact order (similar to
access). Terms of the post-divorce arrangement may be set by prohibited steps or specific issues
orders (s. 8 of the Act).
45 Interestingly, Hoffmnan, supra note 13, the European Court of Human Rights decision,
suggests that, even in England, a religious parent may resort to a "human rights" argument with
respect to custody. Andrew Bainham sees the case as opening the door in England to a clash of
rights within the family: supra note 43. This shows that England, like Canada, is beginning to
struggle with combining the family law and constitutional rights approaches.
46 R.S.C. 1985 (2d Supp.), c. 3.
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to custody or access
shall give effect to the principle that a child of the marriage should have as much contact
with each spouse as is consistent with the best interests of the child and, for that purpose,
shall take into consideration the willingness of the person for whom custody is sought to
facilitate such contact.
4 7
When parents disagree over religion, or when one parent objects to the
involvement of the children in the practices of the other parent, the
principle of maximum contact would seem to welcome the children's
exposure to two sets of beliefs and practices, and, further, a non-
exclusionary religious upbringing.48
Thus, even if framed as a question of family law-a
characterization that initially appears to operate to the benefit of the
custodial mother-the flexible and moving standard of best interests
may operate to the detriment of stability and custodial authority.49 This
twist in the expected consequences of a family law approach explains
why the Supreme Court of Canada judgments of L'Heureux-Dub6 J. and
McLachlin J. in Young and P. (D.) can both be based on "best interests"
at the same time that they differ in result. The reasons given by
L'Heureux-Dub6 J. for upholding restrictions on the access parents
adopt the stronger family law characterization of the issues raised. Yet
it is possible, as illustrated by McLachlin J., to strike down those same
restrictions and thus limit the authority of the custodial parent, all on the
basis of best interests.
2. An issue of constitutional rights: the content
and limits of parental freedoms
Casting a constitutional light on the issues related to religion as a
factor in custody decisionmaking seems somewhat foreign to Canadian
jurisprudence. Parental rights have been examined and analyzed, and
47 On implications of this principle see, for example, B. Hovius, "The Changing Role of the
Access Parent" (1994) 10 C.F.L.Q. 123, especially at 164-85: "Access Parentg' Involvement in
Religious Upbringing." See also N. Weisman, "On Access after Parental Separation" (1992) 36
R.F.L (3d) 35.
48 This is in keeping with general changes that are currently being discussed in custody and
access regimes. See Canada, Department of Justice, Custody and Access: Public Discussion Paper
(Ottawa: Communications and Consultation, Department of Justice, 1993).
49 Not only might restrictions on the access parent be removed, but the custodial parent could
find herself subject to restraints with respect to her beliefs and practices-a far cry from full control
over religious upbringing.
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ostensibly rejected in favour of parental responsibilitiesO5 in the absence
of any backdrop of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms.SJ United
States jurisprudence, however, has no trouble with acknowledging the
constitutional rights contours of family law 52 Indeed, the "family" is
protected by a constitutional guarantee of parental liberty grounded in
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, bolstered by the guarantee of
the free exercise of religion, found in the First Amendment.53 Further,
the meaning of those guarantees has been worked out to a significant
extent in disputes relating to family issues, whether education, birth
control and abortion, or child welfare 54 The Establishment clause has
forbidden extensive analysis of religious doctrine and has been argued to
prohibit the courts' consideration of factors relevant to the child's
spiritual well-being in allocating custody. In conjunction with this, the
Free Exercise clause supports an argument against restrictions on the
individual parent's beliefs and practices, ostensibly including those
involving children.
As in the family context above, this discussion will not emphasize
the issue of religion in the determination of custody. Suffice it to say
that American courts, like those in England and Canada, shy away from
making explicit choices between religions when assessing the best
50 See, for example, Frame v. Smith, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 99.
51 A quick survey of the rights now guaranteed under the Charter suggests, however, that a
number may be applicable to questions arising related to the family. The guarantee of liberty (s. 7),
the freedoms of expression (s. 2(b)), association (s. 2(d)), conscience and religion (s. 2(a)), mobility
rights (s. 6(1)), aboriginal rights (ss. 35 & 35.1), the guarantee of equality (s. 15(1)), and the
principle of interpretation in a manner consistent with the multicultural heritage of Canadians (s.
27) are all possible candidates for relevance to family law matters. See, for example, N. Bala & D.
Cruickshank, "Children and the Charter of Rights" in B. Landau, ed., Children's Rights in the
Practice of Family Law (Toronto: Carswell, 1986) 28; D.A. Rollie Thompson, "Why Hasn't the
Charter Mattered in Child Protection?" (1989) 8 Can. J. Fam. L. 133; "Riding the Fences," supra
note 16; and Religion and Culture, supra note 14.
52 See "Religion and Custody," supra note 5 at 906: "[S]o deeply embedded is rights thinking
in the American psyche that the first thought of courts and commentators is to try to cram every
legal problem into a rights category." See also God and Constitution, supra note 21 at 82-137, where
religion, constitutional rights, and the family are discussed with attention to issues such as marriage,
homosexuality, abortion, and the religious upbringing of children.
53 See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) [hereinafter Meyer]; Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925) [hereinafter Pierce]; Prince v. Massachussetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); and
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) [hereinafter Yoder]. See also: Note, "Developments in the
Law-The Constitution and the Family" (1980) 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1156; and Mangrum, supra note 16
at 75: "the legitimacy of parental rights as part of our cultural and legal heritage and as an
important part of personal liberty."
54 See "History of Family Law," supra note 29.
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interests of a child.55 The courts' avoidance of explicitly preferring one
form of religious behaviour over another may not look especially
dependent on constitutional guarantees. However, courts may be more
hesitant than they would otherwise be to find that religious practices in
conflict with more broadly shared childbearing norms are harmful to
children otherwise best served by being in the custody of that parent.5 6
American courts have insisted that harm to the children be shown before
denying custody on the basis of religion, although they have disagreed
over the certainty and amount of harm necessary.5 7 The guiding
principle, however, is the avoidance of either the endorsement or
rejection of specific forms of religious upbringing5S
It is in the context of setting limits on the scope of visitation or
custody that the relationship between constitutionally guaranteed
individual rights and parental control over the religious upbringing of
children is brought to light. While custodial authority over religious
upbringing is related to the general parental right to privacy in the
rearing of children protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments,5 9 the access parent can make a parallel argument that the
individual right to free exercise of religion, guaranteed by the First
55 Despite the principle of anti-establishment, courts do not feel obliged to ignore the effects
of parental religious practices on children. Indeed, the specific factors to be considered in
ascertaining best interests may include religious or spiritual well-being in several states. See Paul,
supra note 16 at 600 and n. 85. Some states (Alaska, Hawaii, and South Carolina) have codified the
best interests standard and list religion or spiritual well-being as a factor to be considered: see
Alaska Stat. § 25.24.150(c)(1) (1983); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 571-46(5)(1985); and S.C. Code Ann. §
20-3-160 (Law. Co-op. 1996). Further, courts traditionally have favoured some form of religious
training as beneficial to children, even against the backdrop of anti-establishment concerns, See
Beschle, supra note 16 at 397-402; and "Establishment Clause," supra note 16 at 1703-0.
56 See, for example, L. Pfeffer, "Religion in the Upbringing of Children" (1955) 35 B.U. L.
Rev. 333 at 366.
57 See Quiner, supra note 24, where the test of "immediate harm" or "actual impairment" was
applied. See "Religion and Custody," supra note 5 at 880-97, for a discussion of this case. In Re
Marriage of Hadeen, 619 P.2d 374 (Wash. 1980), the test of "reasonable and substantial likelihood of
immediate or future impairment" was used.
58 But see Bumham, supra note 24, specifically criticized by Mangrum, supra note 16 at 26-30,
as an example of best interests prevailing over parental rights. The mother was Fatima Crusader
and she said that she would cut her daughter out of her life if she disobeyed the rules of the Church.
Teachings of the Church included a "master plot on the part of Jews and Communists to gain
control of the world." The daughter's welfare was deemed to be endangered, and the mother
therefore was denied custody. This is an "unusual" case and decision according to Beschle, supra
note 16 at 401.
59 In practice, religious upbringing is usually left to the custodial parent. See L.P. Strickman,
"Marriage, Divorce and the Constitution" (1981) 15 Fam. LQ. 259 at 337; and J.M. Fitzgerald, "An
Overview of Religious Considerations in Child Custody Disputes" (1989) 32 Catholic Lawyer 129 at
135.
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Amendment, includes the ability to share religious beliefs and teachings
with one's children. Following that argument, a custodial parent's
complaints with respect to interference by the access parent with the
child's religious upbringing would not justify the imposition of
restrictions on access. Rather, such restrictions, depending on their
severity and consequences,6 0 would contravene the First Amendment
rights of the non-custodial parent. 61
The consequences of this approach for the tailoring or
modification of the terms of access seem, at first glance, blatantly clear:
any restrictions would be prohibited as violations of a fundamental
freedom. Despite this possible characterization of the access parent's
constitutional rights as absolute, however, the notion of harm has always
limited and continues to limit those rights in the United States. 62 In the
area of custody this has meant that courts have been reluctant to discard
their power to impose restrictions on the non-custodial parent. Thus,
many judges continue to exercise their discretion to protect children
from harm by tailoring the terms of access. They do vary, however, in
their willingness to find "harm" sufficient to limit an access parent's
religiously inspired actions. Severe conflict between the custodial and
60 Beschle, supra note 16 at 422-23, distinguishes among three types of restrictions, saying that
they reflect different levels of interference with the non-custodial parent's free exercise right: a)
driving of children to and from religious school or services; b) restrictions on taking children to
religious meetings; and c) restrictions on talking with, or proselytizing children. He sees the third
type as the most troubling because it is not only an intrusion on the right, but also contrary to the
value of religious pluralism.
61 Two major assumptions inform this approach. First, the link between the guarantees of
constitutional privacy and freedom of religion, on the one hand, and the authority of parents over
children, on the other, depends to a large extent on the notion of an "intact" or pre-divorce family
protected from state intervention. Transporting those guarantees without modification to the
context of divorce assumes that they operate as fully for each individual rights-holding parent as
they do for parents as a unit, and that the rights may be exercised by each parent as against the
other. Second, the connection assumes that the full recognition of these constitutional guarantees
for an adult translates into that person's power or authority as a parent. That is, the very content of
a parent's individual free exercise of religion is understood to include the right to share, teach, or
pass on his or her religious beliefs, practices and identity. If this is so, it would follow that the
diminishing of parental control over religious upbringing, for example, would be mirrored by a
diminishing of the constitutional freedom itself. Both assumptions are open to challenge.
Constitutional rights may operate very differently, if at all, in the context of conflicts between
parents. And it is possible to question the way in which individual freedom of religion has generally
carried with it the right to bring up one's children in a particular faith.
62 "The state's reluctance to interfere in the upbringing of children, particularly where religion
is involved, must nevertheless be set aside when their welfare is at stake,": God and Constitution,
supra note 21 at 131. Mangrum, supra note 16 at 74, arguing from a strong parental free exercise
stance, acknowledges an element of best interests. That is, parents have extensive, but not complete,
authority; he lists limited situations (e.g., "substantial harm" or a child's actual religious needs)
where religious beliefs enter into the decision-making process.
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access parent may be labelled harmful enough to justify restrictions on
the access parent's religious discussions and behaviour.63 At the same
time, courts seem to be increasingly reluctant to find exposure to
different religions, in itself, harmful to the children of interfaith
parents.64
A further limit on the parental freedom model stems from the
phenomenon of court orders which split "spiritual" and "physical"
custody between the parents.6 5 Ostensibly a response to the
constitutional claims of the access parent, such an arrangement means
that the custodial parent looks after the children while the non-custodial
parent controls the religious upbringing of those children.66 Restrictions
accordingly may be placed on the custodial parent's practices at the
behest of the access parent. Far from the model of custodial authority
and control described in the family law context, this is a situation which
can be described as not only an infringement on the scope of custody but
also a violation of the custodial parent's own free exercise of religion.
That is, the very recognition of the individual rights-bearing nature of
the access parent mandates similar recognition for the custodial
parent.67 If restrictions on access are seen as unconstitutional, this is
equally the case for restrictions on custody. What looks like a potential
constitutional "trump" on behalf of the access parent thus turns out to
63 See, for example, LeDouc v. LeDoux, 452 N.W.2d 1 (Neb. 1990). The case is singled out by
"Religion and Custody," supra note 5 at 899-904, as an example of injury to a child resulting from
each parent's insistence on practising and teaching his or her own religion. The child suffered
serious stress as a result of conflicting Catholic and Jehovah's Witness teachings. The Court upheld
an order prohibiting the non-custodial father from exposing the child to inconsistent practices and
teachings.
64 See Beschle, supra note 16.
65 See Paul, supra note 16. The author examines the concept of "spiritual custody" and argues
that any decision to give the noncustodial parent control over the child's religious upbringing
constitutes a violation of the right to free exercise of religion held by the custodial parent. He
argues that, once the child's home has been established any further infringement of the custodial
parent's rights should be subject to strict scrutiny. That is, restrictions could be justified only on the
basis of physical or actual psychological harm.
66 Paul, supra note 16 at 585, note 13, for a discussion of several cases. For example, children
in the custody of their Baptist mother were ordered to go to Catholic school (Vazquez v. Vazquez,
443 So.2d 313 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)); in another situation, an antenuptial agreement to raise
the children as Jews could not be modified when the Catholic custodial mother wanted the children
to go to Catholic school (Gottlieb v. Gottlieb, 31 I11. App. 2d 120 (1961)). In the case of Romano v.
Romano, 283 N.Y.S.2d 813 (1967), a Jehovah's Witness mother with custody was ordered to allow
the Catholic father to take the children to Catholic day school and church.
67 See "Religion and Custody," supra note 5 at 885. The author declares, in the context of
Quiner, supra note 24, and the question of custody allocation: "To put the point crudely, the two
rights cancel each other."
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be significantly restricted.68 It is modified by the consideration of harm,
with the understanding that limits on the access parent's behaviour may
be justified despite the associated interference with individual freedom
of religion. And it may clash irreconcilably with the existence of
identical rights held by the custodial parent who wants to exercise her
freedom of religion by overseeing the spiritual upbringing of the
children.
The paradigmatic structure for resolving conflicts over religious
upbringing in the context of custody thus becomes a clash between
parental rights. The 1990 Pennsylvania case of Zummo 69 provides a
good illustration of this structure. In Zummo, three children, aged
three, four, and eight, were being raised as Reform Jews and were
enrolled in Jewish religious education according to an agreement within
marriage between their Jewish mother and their non-practising Catholic
father. Upon separation, the mother retained physical custody of the
children and continued their upbringing within Judaism. At the same
time, the non-custodial father expressed a desire to take the children to
Catholic church services with him during his weekend visitation periods,
partly with the intent of more fully exposing them to their Italian
heritage. The judge at first instance prohibited him from doing so.
Saying that it would be contrary to the best interests of the children to
interrupt the stability of their religious beliefs by exposing them to
conflicting religions, and that the agreement during marriage with
respect to religious upbringing should continue to govern this particular
situation, the judge ordered the father not to take the children to
religious services contrary to the Jewish faith.Z0
On appeal, the restriction was overturned. According to the
68 Before the Supreme Court of Canada, the Jehovah's Witness non-custodial fathers in the
Young and P. (D.) appeals argued that their freedom of religion, guaranteed by the Charter, should
prohibit a court from placing restrictions on access in the name of best interests. The argument
seemed to assume that a Charter-based structure of analysis would benefit the access parent in any
dispute over religious practices involving the children.
69 Supra note 17. The case merits special attention because it has been enthusiastically
embraced by some Canadian commentators and lawyers eager to see both the introduction of the
access parent's freedom of religion to the Canadian analysis, and a decrease in traditional custodial
control. See, for example, Religion and Culture, supra note 14 at 79-89. See also Factum of the
Appellant D.P., Supreme Court of Canada, Court File No. 22296 in P.(D.), supra note 9
[unpublished]; and Factum of the Respondent James Kam Chen Young, Supreme Court of Canada,
Court File No. 22227 in Young, supra note 9 [unpublished], on appeal to the Supreme Court of
Canada. In response to the arguments put before the court and based on Zummo, see the reasons
of L'Heureux-Dub6 J. in Young, at 89-97; and in P.(D.), at 181. I return to Zummo in the context of
an exploration of the identity and integrity of children in Part IV, below.
70 C.P., Montgomery County, Civil Division, No. 87-09747, Ott, J.
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Pennsylvania Superior Court, the father's parental authority was
attached to a right to "pursue whatever course of religious
indoctrination [of the children] which [he] sees fit ... during periods of
... visitation." 71 The court went on to say that, while the agreement as to
Jewish upbringing of the children was unenforceable, and the children
had no legally recognizable religious identity, the mother held an equal
constitutional right to the free exercise of her religious beliefs.
Accordingly, the court ruled that the father, who had access on
weekends, could take the children to Mass, but that he had to deliver
them to synagogue for Jewish religious school on Sunday mornings.
That is, the father had the right to have the children accompany him to
church but also had an obligation not to violate the mother's
corresponding right to give the children a Jewish education and
upbringing. This was the custody/access regime understood to resolve a
rights conflict between the parents.
The parental freedom framework perceived to benefit the non-
custodial parent may not resolve the difficulties of post-divorce religious
upbringing any more satisfactorily than the custodial authority
framework. Just as the shifting meaning of children's "best interests"
limited custodial authority under a family law model, that of "harm" to
children limits non-custodial access under a constitutional law model.
Further, as suggested by Zummo, the reconciliation of conflicting
fundamental individual freedoms guaranteed to each parent is far from
easy or obvious. The often uncompromising nature of religious beliefs
means that no court-directed scheme of custody and access will fully
meet the constitutional demands made by both parents.72
C. A False Dichotomy
The dichotomy between a family law model understood as
advantageous to the custodial parent (usually the mother) and a
constitutional model understood as advantageous to the access parent
(usually the father) is overly simplistic. Either parent can use either
model to back his or her position. The task in resolving conflicts over
religious upbringing between custody and access parents, then, is not
one of choosing between two mutually exclusive frameworks. Instead, it
71 Zummo, supra note 17 at 1140.
72 Along these lines, it has been suggested that the child's interests would be better served if
visitation were not considered a parental right. See White, supra note 16 at 296. For further
ditcussion and critique of Zummo, see Parts III(B) and IV(C), below.
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may be one of understanding the way in which the two can inform each
other and, further, may require substantial modification drawn from
alternative frameworks.
The Supreme Court of Canada judgments in Young and P. (D.)
reinforce this conclusion. It is true that the arguments put forward in
the appeals did tend to ask the Court to make a choice between a
pro-custody solution derived from family law and a pro-access solution
based on constitutional rights. And the two major sets of reasons,
offered by L'Heureux-Dub6 and McLachlin JJ., do diverge roughly
along the lines that divide a traditional family law approach from a
rights-based constitutional law approach. That is, for L'Heureux-Dub6
J., priority goes to supporting custody and the decisionmaking powers
and responsibilities that accompany it. Children are entitled to the best
possible custody and access arrangement, one in which ongoing conflict
is minimized and in which constitutional rights play no part. For
McLachlin J., on the other hand, emphasis is put on maximal contact
between each parent and the children involved subject to their best
interests and, more particularly, to the risk of harm associated with
actions taken by either parent.7 3 Again, any significance of
constitutional rights is undercut by McLachlin J.'s opinion that parental
freedom of religion, even if a factor, would be limited according to best
interests. However, her approach does coincide with a constitutional
model in which the access parent's ability to include the children in
religious beliefs and practices would be subject to maximal contact
between the custodial parent and the children and, more importantly, to
any harm associated with the practices.
Both judges claim to follow a best interests of the child
approach, grounded in family law principles, that rejects a Charter-based
characterization of the issues at stake. Following the same general
approach, albeit with very different contours, they reach opposing
conclusions-one prepared to restrict the access parent, the other
prepared to eliminate restrictions. Both "choose" the family law model
but understand best interests differently; both decline to "choose" the
constitutional law model, but differ on their willingness to adopt the
notion of harm. What is evident is that "best interests" and "harm" are
both terms with open-ended definitions and, further, that they operate
as sides of the same coin, both used to justify a judge's decision as to the
scope of custody and access.
73 See Hockey v. Hockey (1989), 69 O.R. (2d) 338 (Div. Ct.), in which a Jehovah's Witness
access father was allowed to take his children to services against the wishes of their Catholic
custodial mother. No harm was found by the court.
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III. ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORKS FOR A
MULTI-FACETED ISSUE
In rejecting a choice between the family law and constitutional
law models as they have been traditionally understood, I turn now to the
perspectives of children and religious communities themselves and
suggest that they complicate the analysis in a necessary and realistic way.
By introducing the following approaches to decisionmaking in the
context of religion and custody, I set the stage for a further examination
of the concepts of best interests and harm. I suggest that the
relationship between children and their communities may be captured by
an element of "identity" in the best interests equation, and that the
responsibility for shielding children from harm connected to that
relationship may be captured by an element of "integrity."
A. Recognition of Difference and The Coexistence of Communities
1. The importance of membership
The religious communities to which parents involved in these
custody disputes belong have a vital, if muted, stake in the outcome of
legal proceedings. In responding to children of interfaith partnerships,
courts provide an indication of the state's recognition of the religious
communities involved and, more broadly, of the diversity of communities
that coexist. For any given religious community-whether large,
generally integrated, and liberal, or small, insulated, and
traditional-ongoing existence and strength depend literally and
rhetorically on "its" children. 74 Accordingly, it is extremely important to
each community that it be able to welcome and retain child members.
At the, same time, the affiliations that children have with their
communities (for example, cultural, ethnic, and linguistic, as well as
religious) have a significant impact on their development and sense of
identity. An exploration of the perspective of communities in what
otherwise look like "familial" disputes can shed light both on the
74 Of course, this dependence may be articulated in very different ways by more traditional
and more liberal groups, even within the same religion. See God and Constitution, supra note 21 at
20, on the similarity between traditional Catholics, fundamentalist Protestants, and Orthodox Jews
as compared with liberal religious self-understanding and communities.
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interactions between law and a diverse, multicultural reality, and on the
meaning of community affiliation for children.75
The relationship between religious communities and children is
mediated by parents who are, of course, the parties in any custody
conflict where religion is an issue. The meaning of adult membership in
a given religious community may well include a commitment to raising
children to be members themselves, and it is clear that parents play an
important part in initiating and cementing the affiliations of their
children. 76 Interestingly, the very existence of children may influence
adult membership in a given religious community in the sense that a
parent may reinforce his or her commitment in order to bring up
children within the community. In an interfaith relationship, then, the
parents can be characterized as representatives of their respective
religions. The conflict over religious upbringing and the scope of
custody and access becomes a struggle between members of two
communities, both of which may feel compelled to pass on membership
to their children.
2. Community claims in the custody context
A brief sketch of the relationship among child, parent and
community reveals that a court's resolution of a custody dispute may be
perceived as either supportive or destructive of a religious community's
existence in the larger society. When a judge restricts an access parent
from sharing religious beliefs and practices with his children, the
religious community to which that parent belongs is affected in symbolic
and concrete ways. A message as to the unacceptability of certain
precepts and practices may be conveyed by such a judgment; further, it is
unlikely that a child will "choose" a religion if he or she has no contact
with it. While the interests or claims of the particular communities
75 See C. Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition" in C. Taylor, Multiculturalism and "The Politics
of Recognition" with commentary by A. Gutmann, ed., (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1994) 25 at 62-63, for a discussion of the discourse of recognition and identity and the way in which
the latter is partly shaped by the former. According to Taylor, at 36, the importance of recognition
is now universally acknowledged: "Not only contemporary feminism but also race relations and
discussions of multiculturalism are undergirded by the premise that the withholding of recognition
can be a form of oppression."
76 This is made explicit in the case of Ramon v. Ramon, 34 N.Y.S.2d 100 (Dom. Rel. Ct., 1942)
[hereinafter Ramon]. A Roman Catholic father and Protestant mother agreed that the children
would be baptized and educated in the Catholic religion. The Court made reference to Canon Law
and the biblical interdiction of intermarriage, saying that Catholics are bound to raise their children
in the Catholic faith; otherwise they may face excommunication.
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implicated in custody proceedings do not mean that those communities
become parties on their own, the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society
of Canada (i.e., the Jehovah's Witnesses) was recognized as one of the
respondents before the Supreme Court in Young. The fact that the
Seventh Day Adventist Church, a group not directly affected by the
recent appeals, presented arguments before the Court as an intervenor
underlines the significance of the cases for religious communities in
general.
The claims made by communities, whether explicitly or
implicitly, arise out of two general situations in which post-divorce
families in a diverse society may find themselves. First, parents simply
may adhere to different religions; alternatively, one parent may belong
to a closed or strict religious community which dictates a certain way of
life for its members.77 In the first situation, both religious communities
may lay claim to the religious identity of the children. In the second,
denial of custody or restrictions on access based on parental membership
may be experienced as a severe blow to the particular community which,
in turn, may articulate a claim based on equal standing and
multiculturalism.
In a diverse society in which different faiths and cultures can
flourish in co-existence, and in which individuals can grow and develop
partly through connections and affiliation, such claims on behalf of
communities may deserve recognition.78 Indeed, in Canada, sections 15
and 27 of the Charter appear to direct and facilitate such recognition. 79
And yet, as we shall see, even the deepest respect for religious
communities does not yield obvious answers to the questions raised in
77 This second situation arises when one parent either joins or exits such a community, thereby
creating conflict. In the context of such a community, it is essentially impossible for one spouse to
belong while the other doesn't, as long as the two individuals remain together (and, especially, if
they parent together). If both parents belong to such a community initially and both remain
members, then a conflict over custody would either be resolved outside a secular forum or, at least,
would not raise the issue of religious practice (unless the question of which parent was more
committed to the religious community was raised before a secular court-highly unlikely if both are
devout members). For religion to enter a secular custody conflict, then, one parent may join a "way
of life" religious community in the context of marriage, and the resulting conflict would be linked to
the breakdown of the relationship. Alternatively, both might belong to the same community initially
and one might exit that community. In both cases, the issue of religion could well become the core
of the custody dispute. The observation to be emphasized here is that some conflict in the
relationship precedes conflict before a court.
78 This is not the same as deference. This challenge is similar to that which Taylor articulates,
supra note 75 at 63, of "dealing with their [members of cultures that question liberalism] sense of
marginalization without compromising our basic political principles."
79 Equality and multiculturalism, respectively. See "Racial and Cultural Issues," supra note
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custody decisionmaking.O Before turning to the problems with full
recognition of community perspectives, however, it is helpful to describe
briefly the ways in which community claims are packaged within the
custody dispute context in order to better explore the court's response.
Within a family law model, the decision as to allocation or scope
of custody is guided by a notion of custodial authority limited by the best
interests of the children involved. A community-based approach would
suggest that the assessment of best interests be based on an appreciation
of diverse modes of childrearing and religious upbringing across
communities, and on an understanding of the importance of community
affiliation for children. Thus, it could be argued that custody should be
allocated to the parent through which the child could best retain
membership in his or her community.81 The argument might become
even stronger if the community in question were understood to be a
minority group in a larger society, in need of (and perhaps claiming the
right to) protection. 2 The strongest claim on behalf of communities
would suggest that best interests of children coincide with community
affiliation even (or especially) when the particular religious beliefs and
practices clash with liberal values espoused by the state.83 If we turn to a
constitutional law model, it initially appears difficult to factor
community concerns into assertions of individual rights. However, the
recognition of a parental right to direct children's religious upbringing
allows for the interests of religious groups to be played out behind
individual claims. Indeed, freedom of religion may become a vehicle for
80 See generally M. Minow, Making All the Difference-Inclusion, Exclusion, and American
Law (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990) on the diversity of individuals and groups in the United
States and especially the responses of law to the "dilemma of difference."
81 See, for example, Zemans, supra note 16 at 158: "The concept of the family is amorphous
and culturally grounded, thus precluding any 'a-cultural' treatment of the concept and similarly
preventing any set of 'a-cultural' values that attach to the concept of the family from being defined."
See also F. Zemans, "The Issue of Cultural Diversity in Custody Disputes" (1983) 32 R.F.L. (2d) 50.
82 In Canada, this kind of argument is most prevalent in discussions of First Nations children.
Strong criticisms have been aimed at the notion and application of "best interests," particularly in
the contexts of welfare and adoption, based on the related devaluing of a child's First Nations
identity and affiliation. See, for example, M. Kline, "Child Welfare Law, 'Best Interests of the Child'
Idealogy, and First Nations" (1992) 30 Osgoode Hall L.J. 375; C. Davies, "Native Children and the
Child Welfare System in Canada" (1992) 30 Alta L. Rev. 1200; A. McGillivray, "Transracial
Adoption and the Status Indian Child" (1985) 4 Can. J. Fam. L. 437; P.A. Monture, "A Vicious
Circle: Child Welfare and the First Nations" (1989) 3 C.J.W.L. 1; and P. Zylberberg, "Who Should
Make Child Protection Decisions for the Native Community" (1991) 11 Windsor Y.B. Access Just.
74.
83 See, for example, Robichaud v. Robichaud (1978), 6 R.F.L. (2d) 22 (Sask. Q.B.). See also
the discussion of the case in Religion and Culture, supra note 14 at 22 and at 34.
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advancing the interests of religious communities to which parents
belong. That is, in alleging a violation of freedom of religion in the form
of denial of custody or restrictions on access, a parent implicitly invokes
the community to which he or she belongs and to which the child has
formed or might form valuable links. From the perspective of religious
communities, then, it might well be advantageous to support a
rights-based analysis of custody disputes involving religious upbringing.8 4
If parental control over, or at least influence on, children's religious
identity is constitutionally protected, then the focus of courts shifts away
from the question of whether community norms are understood to serve
the best interests of those children.
3. Risks of recognition
As just described, it is possible to imagine community claims as
instrumental in analyzing best interests or individual parental rights
within a religion and custody context. However, it must be pointed out
that the relationship between secular courts and religious systems
creates an initial limit to an analysis derived from community
perspectives. That is, religious communities and the state clearly may
conflict over the understanding of children's best interests. Similarly, the
court's notion of harm to children-the factor limiting the exercise of
parental rights-may be defined differently by religious communities,
especially those whose tenets are far removed from mainstream faiths.
From their perspective, it might be argued that, in imposing the state's
notion of harm, a court mounts a direct attack on religious communities
and their ability to continue.8 5 For example, a finding that proselytizing
door-to-door was, in itself, harmful to a child whose custodial parent
objected to the behaviour, would be a severe blow to the Jehovah's
Witnesses as a group for whom part of their religious existence includes
that practice.
An awareness of the impact of decisions in the "private" sphere
of the family on the "public" sphere of communities in a multicultural
state should lead to a more sophisticated understanding of, and
84 This was, in fact, the case in the positions argued before the Supreme Court in Young, supra
note 9; and P.(D.),supra note 9. That is, the religious groups involved understood their concerns to
be best met by a Charter protection approach, and were concerned that the malleability of "best
interests" worked against them.
85 Such an argument might be derived from a Coverian analysis of the issue, taking into the
account the distinct "nomos" of each community. See R.M. Cover, "The Supreme Court 1982
Term: Foreword: Nomos and Narrative" (1983) 97 Harv. L Rev. 4.
[VOL. 35 No. 2
Religion, Custody, and a Child's Identities
justification for, the court's actions.86 Yet, unless courts abandon their
task of determining best interests of children and protecting children
from harm, the clash between the norms of a liberal state and those of
particular religious communities necessarily will continue to characterize
disputes over religion in the custody/access context. In addition, the
secular perspectives of judges confronted with public expressions of
religion, sometimes in its more intense or fundamentalist forms, will
continue to influence their analysis of parental beliefs and practices.8 7
Embracing an approach that truly deferred to communities88 and their
perspectives might eliminate this phenomenon of normative conflict, but
different problems would emerge. Two major risks of such recognition
are especially apparent. Not only does a framework that envisages
community perspectives dictating the outcome of disputes over religion
and custody fail to appreciate the conflict between communities
themselves, but it may overlook the dangers of a monolithic perception
of community.
The first problem with a community-based framework, then, is
that custody disputes can become irreconcilable conflicts between
religious communities which cannot accept the potential for more than
one religious community in a child's life. From the perspective of each
religion involved, adherence to more than one community is often
8 6 See S. Van Praagh, "The Youngest Members-Harm to Children and the Role of Religious
Communities" in M.A. Fineman & R. Mykitiuk, eds., The Public Nature of Private Violence (New
York: Routledge, 1994) 148 [hereinafter "The Youngest Members"].
87 The sense one gets from Canadian cases, in particular, is of judges who may be privately
observant expressing concerns over religious behaviour that characterizes a public way of life for
individual parents fighting over custody or access. That is, the problem may not be with the
particular religion at stake but rather simply with "too much" religion in a given parent's life. It is
worthwhile to remember that surveys in the United States suggest that 90 per cent of Americans
identify themselves as religious: "Portrait of Religion in U.S. Holds Dozens of Surprises" The New
York Times (10 April 1992) Al. In Canada, it seems that the number of Canadians reporting "no
religion" is increasing: "Protestant Numbers Tumbling" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (2 June
1993) Al. However, a sociologist commenting on the 1991 Statistics Canada results reported in the
article did say that "88 per cent of Canadian people still see themselves as religious."
88 Such an approach may be found behind "religion matching" laws in adoption. For example:
"One possible goal of religious matching is to help a church or a synagogue retain 'its own.' ... This
aim, however, is hardly a proper one for government under the Constitution": M. Paulsen,
"Constitutional Problems of Utilizing a Religious Factor in Adoptions and Placements of Children"
in Oaks, ed., supra note 21, 133. In the context of race-matching in adoption, the discussion is more
complex. See, for example, T. Perry, "Race and Child Placement: The Best Interests Test and the
Cost of Discretion" (1990-91) 29 J. Fain. L. 51.
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inconceivable or impossible.8 9 But, in a diverse society in which
interfaith marriage or partnership is common, children may have real or
possible connections to more than one religion through their parents.
While this situation opens the door to creative arrangements with
positive consequences for children, it also means that a custody dispute
between individual parents can be transformed into a battle between
communities. Rather than resulting in any clearer decisionmaking,
community-based analysis envisions a secular court choosing between
religions and religious identities, a task for which it is especially poorly
suited. Even if a court did have some way to choose between
communities (for example, by preferring a small, minority group which
has experienced discrimination), it is not clear how that would translate
into deciding the scope of custody and access in any given case.90 For
example, we might be reluctant to defer to community concerns such
that only member parents could raise member children; instead, the
possibility that a child could be primarily a member of a certain
community but be raised by the non-member parent might be
acknowledged.
Thus, even if it were possible to place a priority on communities
and their connections to children, the very structure of a custody dispute
involving religion indicates that children may have or develop
connections to more than one religious community. A strictly religious
approach generally cannot deal with such a situation. Religious doctrine
usually makes little or no space for conflict between communities and,
unlike a secular approach, has great difficulty defining the religious
identity of a child under more than one religious influence.
The second, connected, problem is found in the risk of seeing a
given religious community as monolithic and responding to its claims by
imposing a similarly monolithic religious identity on children. That is,
recognition of affiliation is perhaps easiest when the community is
presented in its least integrated form. Indeed, it is often only within the
community, far from the scrutiny of the secular justice system, that
pluralism in beliefs and practices is evident. A court may thus be
compelled to base its assessment of the religious community's role in a
89 This notion was explicitly referred to by O'Brien J. in Ramon,supra note 76 at 108, which
allowed the incorporation of religious norms into secular life and law: "Indissolubility of marriage
and prohibition of 'mixed marriages' are not mere sectarian rules but are deeply rooted in the
consciousness and history of mankind."
90 See "Religion and Custody," supra note 5 at 887. Schneider points out, in the context of his
analysis of the argument that attributing rights to parents promotes pluralism: "[C]ustody disputes
do not pose a choice between a heterodox religion and some state orthodoxy: the choice must be
between the heterodox religion and whatever views the other parent espouses."
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child's life on an official representation of the community's norms and
practices.
In attempting to accord appropriate respect to the community,
then, courts may look for some "true" or essential group identity of the
child. Expert evidence from Orthodox rabbis, for example, as to
whether a child is truly Jewish may be accepted,91 and the court thereby
may participate in enforcing orthodoxy within a religion in the guise of
good-willed acceptance of difference. From the perspective of the
Orthodox Jewish community in such a case, the involvement of a secular
court in determining the religious identity of children might be
welcomed. From that of the non-Orthodox Jewish community, the
phenomenon of a court relying on one interpretation of who belongs to
the community and who does not, is highly problematic.92 Even if such a
finding does not dictate a particular custody/access arrangement, it does
mean that the court adopts a monolithic view of and from the
community. It accepts one version of the meaning of child membership
and the kind of religious upbringing thereby required.93
These risks suggest that the perspective of religious communities
cannot direct the outcome of disputes over custody and religion. And
yet the many religious communities represented in custody disputes
legitimately have certain interests at stake related to their coexistence in
a diverse society. Filtered through the arguments of individual parents
in the courtroom, the claims of communities are largely ignored in the
explicit reasons given by courts for decisions on allocation of custody or
restrictions on access. Incorporated into the analysis of children's
interests, however, they might play a stronger role by reminding us that,
as developing members of religious communities, children deserve full
consideration of the connections that inform their identity. Thus, while
setting out the contours and consequences of a community-based
approach does not create a functioning alternative framework of
91 In Avitan v. Avitan (1992), 38 R.F.L. (3d) 382 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)) [hereinafter Avitan],
discussed at length in Part IV, below, the judge followed the Jewish "rule" that the child was Jewish
because the wife had converted under Orthodox supervision just prior to the birth.
92 See Seltzer, supra note 6.
93 The fact that religious communities do not necessarily speak with one voice therefore
means that courts prepared to take community perspectives into consideration are asked to make a
choice among varying interpretations of doctrine. This problem arises both in a situation where it
appears that sets of religious beliefs and practices are being compared, and in a situation where a
judge is called upon to, in effect, define the community to which a child belongs. If courts are
hesitant to explicitly engage in the first situation (as well they should be), they should be even more
hesitant to take on the burden implied by the second.
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analysis, it does provide some guidelines for courts as they reflect on the
significance of identity in children's lives.
B. Children's Rights-A Shift in Focus
1. Advocating avoice for children
The final perspective to be considered is that of children
themselves. Children might assert their "rights" such that they direct
court decisions with respect to custody, religious upbringing and
restrictions on access. Such an approach stems from the observation
that, whether characterized primarily by best interests, parental
freedoms, or community claims, disputes over religion and custody
assume children's "silence." A "voice" for the children affected by a
court's decisions is hard to find in a custodial parent's claim to authority,
an access parent's insistence on constitutional rights, or the community's
interests in maintaining young membership. In families with which
courts have no contact, religious conflict is resolved by family members
themselves and any resistance by children to parental control is left
untouched.94 In a custody dispute before a judge, however, children may
have the opportunity to be heard and their "rights" may be placed in the
balance along with those of their parents.
Recipients of much recent attention, children's rights have been
explored against the backdrop of family law and human rights law, and
take on both domestic and international95 dimensions. The notion of
children's rights is still developing within the contours of ongoing
discussion over what it means for children to have and exercise rights.96
Rights for children might entail greater protection from danger or harm;
they might allow children to make decisions as to crucial factors in their
lives such as education or health care; they might force greater scrutiny
of age restrictions; they might dictate youth-responsive safeguards in
criminal proceedings. Rights for children might be envisaged as claims
94 It is, however, possible for religious conflict within the family, while the parents remain
married, to reach a level such that courts do get involved in a child protection context. See, for
example, Protection de la Jeunesse-433, [1990] R.D.F. 280 (Que C.S.), in which the director of
youth protection brought Jehovah's Witness adolescent boys to court for a protection order.
95 Rights of the Child, supra note 4.
96 See, for example, M.D.A. Freeman, ed., Children's Rights: A Comparative Perspective
(Aldershot, U.K.: Darmouth, 1996); P. Alston, ed., Children, Rights and the Law (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1992); and D. Archard, Children: Rights and Childhood (London: Routledge, 1993).
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for attention, services, and protection; they might also be understood to
ground independence, autonomy, and the ability to make choices free of
parental or other control.97
A full analysis of the project of articulating the theory and
practice of children's rights, defining their content, and investigating the
impact of rights on children and the reverse impact of children on
rights,98 is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, this discussion will
focus on two ways in which the perspective of children might be
conveyed through children's "rights" and thereby brought to the issue of
religion in custody decisionmaking. First, it might be argued that
children's decisions and preferences should be heard such that parental
behaviour with respect to religious upbringing is limited; second, a
strong freedom of religion claim might be made out on behalf of young
individual rights-holders. After assessing a children's rights framework
as an analytical solution to religion and custody disputes, I conclude that
response to the perspective of children is crucial but can be included in a
framework that rethinks best interests.
2. A voice in custody decisionmaking
Perhaps the most obvious way to bring the perspective of
children to the issue of religion and custody is to welcome their input
into decisionmaking. With respect to both the question of allocation of
custody and that of the scope of custody and access, children could
assert their right to be heard.99 Thus, they might articulate their
preference as to which parent should retain custody or, in another
context, might indicate a desire to restrict the actions of their access
parent 00 Those preferences or desires could then be factored into the
court's assessment of best interests or of the risk of harm to the children
involved. Alternatively, the express wishes of children might dictate the
97 See M.D.A. Freeman, Rights and Wrongs of Children (London: Pinter, 1983). See also J.
Eekelaar, "The Emergence of Children's Rights" (1986) 6 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 161; and H.H.
Foster & D.J. Freed, "A Bill of Rights for Children" (1972) 6 Fam. L.Q. 343.
98 See "Next Generation," supra note 4, for the argument that attention to children can have
an impact on the notion of "rights" themselves in law.
99 See C. Mahood Huddart & J.C. Ensminger, "Hearing the Voice of Children" (1992) 8
C.F.L.Q. 95.
100 This is tied to an understanding of access as a "right" of the child and not the parent. See,
for example, H.A. Davidson & K. Gerlach, "Child Custody Disputes: The Child's Perspective" in
R.M. Horowitz & H.A. Davidson, eds., Legal Rights of Children (Colorado Springs: Shepard, 1984)
232 at 251-55.
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court's decision directly. While this latter option could be characterized
as more strongly recognizing children's rights, courts have generally
stayed away from asking children to choose a custody/access
arrangement for themselves. Instead, they have moved toward the
former option by listening to children in some less direct way before
determining the custody/access arrangement that best meets their
interests.
A child's right to be heard in a custody dispute thus is usually
understood to operate in tandem with the court's responsibility to
resolve the dispute in the best interests of that child.101 That right is also
limited by the age of the child and his or her capacity to express
preferences and to make decisions. While this aspect of children's rights
is not particular to the context of religion and custody, it played a role in
the Supreme Court of Canada's approach to the two cases that
introduced them to these issues. Indeed, the children's voices, albeit
imagined rather than heard, contribute significantly to the difference in
the disposition of the appeals.
In Young, the non-custodial father undertook at trial not to force
his children to accompany him to religious services against their
expressed wishes. This fact is crucial to the swing vote judges, Cory and
Iacobucci JJ., who underline its importance in their decision to agree
with McLachlin J. that court-dictated restrictions on access were
unnecessary in meeting the best interests of the children. In P. (D.), the
father made no such promise, partly because the child in question was
much younger and thus not considered capable of expressing her
preferences. Given this lack of self-imposed restraint on the father's
behaviour during access, Cory and Iacobucci JJ. declare themselves
prepared to defer to the trial judge and to uphold restrictions for the
reasons given by L'Heureux-Dub6 J.102 Thus, the voices of the children
old enough to make their feelings known about the religious behaviour
of their father during access periods are considered but only indirectly.
That is, a parent's undertaking to listen to those voices (and his
101 Eekelaar, supra note 97, has discussed the problematic nature of these two principles
operating together. That is, the child's decision, made according to the child's rights, may not
coincide with that child's best interests. In Ontario, see Strobridge v. Strobridge (1994), 18 O.R. (3d)
753 (C.A.). Osborne J.A. held that a child's counsel must act as an advocate, and cannot advise the
court with respect to the best interests of the child. For instance, evidence cannot be put before the
court by the child's counsel which then decides the best interests of the child, although the court
acknowledged that the child's preferences would be taken into account in the assessment of the
child's best interests.
102 Thus the confusing result: McLachlin J. has a 4-3 majority in Young, supra note 9, while
L"Heureux-Dub6 J. gets a 5-2 majority in P.(D.), supra note 9.
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fulfilment of that promise) is enough to release the Court from
involvement.
From the perspective of L'Heureux-Dub6 J. who specifically
addresses the question of children's evidence in a custody and access
dispute, this response seems problematic at best. In her reasons given
for upholding the trial judge's initial restrictions on Mr. Young,
L'Heureux-Dub6 J. asserted, in agreement with McLachlin J., that
"expert evidence should not be routinely required to establish the best
interests of the child,"103 and then goes on to say that children's
testimony itself might be "a sufficient evidentiary basis upon which to
restrict access."1 04 Thus, it would seem, children who voice distress,
anger, or disagreement with respect to the behaviour of a parent who
involves them in his religious beliefs and activities during access should
have an impact on a court's decision to restrict that parent. Presumably,
a parent's undertaking not to act in a way contrary to the children's
wishes would not satisfy the court's responsibility to take those wishes
seriously. Beyond asserting a right to be heard with respect to questions
of allocation or scope of custody, making space for the perspective of
children brings a challenge to parental authority. That is, a custodial
parent's control over upbringing and education might be questioned by a
child-focused framework of analysis. In the context of religion and
custody disputes, an additional challenge might be aimed at a religious
community's authority with respect to child members. Indeed, any
relationship which implies the exercise of power over children is
potentially subject to attack from the notion of children's rights. The
risk of damage or harm resulting from a parental exercise of such power
is indeed a particularly significant target for advocates of children's
voices.
In outlining the possibly far-reaching implications of a
framework of analysis derived from the perspective of children, I am not
suggesting that parent-directed upbringing of children should
disintegrate, or that the responsibility of judges in custody and access
matters be replaced by the express desires of children. Indeed, critiques
of the general application of traditional notions of rights to children are
highly persuasive, especially when they underline children's dependence,
vulnerability, and need for support and resources.l05 Further, the risks
103 Young, supra note 9 at 86.
104 Ibid.
105 See M. Minow, "Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover" (1987) 96 Yale L.J. 1860
[hereinafter "Interpreting Rights"].
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to children associated with freedom of decisionmaking, perhaps
especially in the context of custody disputes, are significant.106 I do,
however, want to suggest that an emphasis on the perspective of
children, often captured by the language of rights, conveys an
appreciation of their integrity and entitlement to concern and respect.10 7
That is, we can take from a children's rights framework a commitment to
the perspective of children in the court's decisionmaking process, and to
a critical stance towards any negative exercise of power over children.
3. Freedom of religion for children
In the particular context of religion and custody, the framework
of children's rights introduces the possibility of claims by children to
freedom of religion. That is, the basis for listening to children and
questioning parental power can be grounded in freedom of religion in
these cases. Especially with respect to a constitutional model of analysis
that places great weight on the rights of parents to the free exercise of
their religious beliefs, children's advocates might well argue that the
emphasis is misplaced. Instead of focusing on parental freedoms and
assuming that an adult's right to freedom of religion incorporates the
right to bring up children within a religious tradition, courts should focus
on the possibility that a child's rights are at stake in custody and access
decisions involving religion. Indeed, the Charter could be seen to
emphasize the potential for a children's rights framework of analysis in
Canada.
Zummo,1 08 the Pennsylvania case discussed earlier as an example
of a rights-based model for resolving disputes over religious upbringing,
provides a good target for criticism along these lines. Indeed, Zummo
has been singled out for attack based on its adoption of a "children as
106 Turning to children in the decisionmaking process may hurt the likelihood of a care-giving
parent-usually the mother-getting custody. See Illusion of Equality, supra note 29, c. 6. As I
discuss in Part IV, below, this in itself might be considered damaging or harmful to children.
107 See M.D.A. Freeman, "Taking Children's Rights More Seriously" in Alston, Parker &
Seymour, eds., supra note 4, 52. Freeman says, at 66, that in advocating rights for children, we have
to recognize their moral integrity. That is, children are persons entitled to equal concern and
respect, holders of actual and potential autonomy, and in need of nurture, care and protection-all
at the same time.
108 Supra note 17.
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property" paradigm.109 By focusing on the rights of the parents, the
court engaged in an instrumentalism whereby "[t]he minor child is a key
tool of the parents' free exercise but has no independent free exercise
protections." 110 Understood to be incapable of asserting any personal
religious identity themselves, the children in this case led religious lives
subject to the exercise of their parents' constitutionally recognized
rights. This critique of Zummo underlines the discrepancy between
children and adults with respect to the ability to hold and exercise
religious rights, and suggests that children might well claim
constitutional protection in their own name. Custody and access
arrangements concerning religion should be scrutinized for any
infringement of the religious freedom of the children involved. 111
Immediate questions are obvious. What would it mean for
children to hold and exercise religious freedoms? And how would such
"rights" be factored into an analysis of a custody dispute in which, as we
have seen, considerations of custodial authority and parental rights are
taken into account? While a full answer to the first question is beyond
the scope of this paper, some observations on why a child's freedom of
religion is difficult to define can be made before turning to the particular
context of custody. The 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child12
provides some valuable insight in this regard. Guaranteed by the States
party to the Convention are a child's right to preserve his or her identity
(article 8) and the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion
(article 14). And yet, the child's freedom of religion is immediately
followed by recognition of the rights and duties of parents to provide
direction to the child in the exercise of his or her right to freedom of
religion "in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child"
(article 14). This is a right, then, intertwined with parental guidance and
authority. Rather than being perceived as independent of parent-child
109 See B.B. Woodhouse, "'Who Owns the Child?': Meyer and Pierce and the Child as
Property" (1992) 33 Wrm. & Mary L. Rev. 995. Woodhouse chooses Zummo as an example of cases
following Yoder, supra note 53, which ratify what she labels an instrumentalist approach to children
established in Meyer, supra note 53; and Pierce, supra note 53.
110 Woodhouse, supra note 109 at 1115.
111 See, for example, Zarowny, supra note 16 at 171-73. He suggests that child custody
situations may be the first context in which a child's right to make decisions based on his or her own
religious beliefs may be tested. Courts may be more willing to make decisions regarding the
religious upbringing of children once their parents' marriage has been dissolved. It is possible that a
child's own choice of religion could defeat a custodial parent's wishes, especially if the child were
backed up by the non-custodial parent.
112 Supra note 4.
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relations, the child's freedom of religion is generally understood to be in
keeping with that of the parents.
The fact that a document dedicated to children's rights does not
contemplate the possibility of a clash between parent and child over
religion initially may seem strange. And yet it is not so suprising when
we consider one of the key elements of adult freedom of religion
combined with assumptions regarding the family. That is, the notion of
autonomous choice has been built into religious freedom" 3 such that
persons have the right to believe and act according to their faith or
conscience. While religious freedom may also include group- or
community-based aspects (as we have seen in the discussion of the
perspective of religious communities above), an individual's
fundamental right to freedom of religion usually is understood to
guarantee that the individual neither is prohibited from acting according
to his or her beliefs nor is forced to act in a way contrary to those
beliefs.114
This aspect of freedom of religion sits uneasily with the way in
which even a rights-oriented liberal society leaves religious upbringing of
children to parents and, by implication, religious communities. In
general, children are not understood to exercise choice at an early age in
the matters of religious belief and practice. Instead, they are brought up
with a certain religious (or non-religious) identity which may play a
significant role in their lives even if it does not feel "chosen." 115 Thus, as
long as a liberal understanding of freedom of religion assumes an adult
113 This has been true at least in liberal democracies such as the United States and Canada in
this century. On religious liberty in the United States in general see, for example, K. Greenawalt,
"Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law" (1984) 72 Cal. L. Rev. 753; M. Galanter, "Religious
Freedoms in the United States: A Turning Point?" [1966] Wisc. L. Rev. 217; M.W. McConnell,
"The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion" (1990) 103 Harv. L. Rev.
1409; Culture of Disbelief, supra note 8; and S. Levinson, "The Multicultures of Belief and Disbelief"
(1994) 92 Mich. L. Rev 1873. Contemporary Canadian jurisprudence on religious freedom includes
R. v. Big M. Drug Mart LtL, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 [hereinafter Big M. Drug Mart]; and CentralAlberta
Dairy Poolv. Alberta Human Rights Commission, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 489, as an example of human rights
case law in Canada dealing with religious discrimination.
114 A discussion of the differences of freedom from religious coercion and freedom to believe
and behave within a certain religion is beyond the scope of this article. My purpose here is merely
to highlight the fact that the ability to choose to be religious or not, or to adhere to a specific
religion, is incorporated into the meaning of freedom of religion for adults.
115 On the apparent contradiction between this deference by liberal society to communities
and families with respect to the upbringing of children, and the emphasis placed by liberal society
on individual freedom, choice and autonomy, see Kymlicka, supra note 3, especially c. 8, where he
suggests that communities that, in effect, "govern" children's lives can be tolerated by liberalism
because of their role as structures within which children develop a capacity to choose how to live
their own lives as adults.
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ability to make choices,l16 and that of children assumes parental
influence, then it is difficult to describe children as "full" holders of the
right. This does not mean that religious freedom has no meaning for
children. Indeed, in significant areas, such as schooling, such freedom is
crucial and might result in a challenge by, or on behalf of, children.
In the context of custody, however, the difficulties with the
notion of a child's right to freedom of religion are particularly blatant.
Parental involvement in religious upbringing is assumed here and a
rights framework challenging interference with the religious beliefs and
practices of children does not respond adequately to the operating
family dynamics. The call for religious freedom in this context does
convey the importance of emphasizing children and their own religious
development, beliefs and practices. The challenge is in maintaining that
emphasis without trying to assign to children fundamental freedoms
designed for adults. Thus, while a right to religious freedom,
traditionally understood, does not appear to capture the perspective of
children of interfaith parents engaged in a dispute over custody and
religion, consideration of that perspective might contribute to a more
child-responsive understanding of such a right. 1 7  For instance, a
membership model of religious freedom, according to which children's
sense of religious affiliation and identity develops through their
relationships with their parents and religious communities-rather than
a model based on choice free from the influence of those
relationships-may be better suited to the needs and interests of these
children.118
How then might we think of a religious identity "right" or
interest tailored to the children of interfaith parents? Here, I want to
outline two possible ways in which courts might respect the child's
perspective on religious upbringing in the context of a dispute over
116 Of course, this concept is subject to critique given its investment in an individual
rights-based framework that gives little weight to dependence, and the inevitability of influence and
relations with others. See, for example, M.A. Glendon, Rights Talk" The Impoverishment of Political
Discourse (New York: Free Press, 1991); J. Nedelsky, "Law, Boundaries and the Bounded Self"
(1990) 30 Representations 162; and "Interpreting Rights," supra note 105.
117 Some of the problems with "rights" identified by, among others, Glendon, supra note 116;
Nedelsky, supra note 116; and Minow in "Interpreting Rights," supra note 105, are particularly
relevant with respect to "children's rights." That is, communities, families and cultures play a
significant role in an analysis of children's rights and interests in the context of custody and religion,
and inform the discussion to follow in Part IV, below.
118 This has been discussed most often in the context of adoption, especially in the United
States. See, for example, Note, "Religious Matching Statutes and Adoption" (1976) 51 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 262.
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exactly that issue. First, we could think of children claiming an interest
in enriching the religious identity in which they have been grounded.
That is, a child of differently believing parents might be brought up with
one religion and the connections to that particular religious community
may be very strong. In such a case, the child's sense of religious identity
should be taken into account by the court before assuming that a "bi-
religious" upbringing after divorce would be appropriate. Conversely, a
child of differently believing parents might claim an interest in
celebrating connections to more than one religious community and, in
such a case, the court should be careful not to insist on a "mono-
religious" upbringing.119 That is, the opportunity for children to be
exposed to more than one religion may well be a positive and welcome
consequence of interfaith relationships.12 0
While these two ways of taking a child's religious affiliation into
account might seem contradictory, they display the complexities of
factoring the perspective of children into the resolution of custody and
religion disputes. They also highlight the significant impact that a court
has on the religious upbringing, beliefs and practices of children when it
delineates the scope of parental custody and access. The notion of
religious freedom for children thus brings the religious aspect of
children's lives to the forefront of an analysis of religion and custody.
Combined with the focus on integrity that a general children's rights
framework insists upon, this emphasis on young religious identity forms
the basis for an enriched understanding of children's best interests in an
interfaith family and a multicultural society.121 The question of how to
understand the court's task in assessing "best interests," in light of the
preceding discussion of alternative frameworks derived from family law,
constitutional law, diverse communities, and children's rights, is the one
with which we are left.
119 Parallels with language can be made. That is, if language is understood in a way that
incorporates cultural community, then "bilingual" children may not have a primary
linguistic/cultural affiliation. Parents (with different languages) may, however, raise children with a
primary cultural/linguistic identity.
120 See discussion in Part IV, below.
121 This can be understood to respond to Woodhouse's critique, supra note 109 at 1114, that
law does not respect children and that children are therefore "denied [their] own voice and
integrity."
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C. Questions Left Unanswered: Toward a Response
The case of religion in custody decisionmaking brought before
the Supreme Court of Canada includes strands of all four of the
approaches set out above. The challenge of recognizing and juggling the
perspective of parents who feel a responsibility to pass on religious or
cultural identity, the perspective of children for whom decisions on
custody and the scope of access have long-term implications, and the
significance to communities of young membership, is built into the issues
raised by Young and P. (D.). So too is the challenge of understanding the
way in which the Charter might be implicated in the examination of
family law principles, claims of religious groups, and children's
upbringing in Canada.
These challenges, so central to the appeals brought to the Court,
remain largely unmet. In response to the questions that were posed, the
Court simply directed Canadian lawmakers, families, and society in
general to children's "best interests." Before proceeding to a discussion
of what content we might give to best interests in the context of religion
and custody, I want to suggest that the Court overlooked the links
between characterizing the issues, the meaning of best interests, and the
relationship between the Charter and the family. That is, the questions
of characterization, best interests, and the Charter are connected: the
answer to the second depends on the first and informs the third.
By emphasizing best interests of children without giving
sufficient attention to the context in which courts try to determine best
interests in custody disputes involving religion, the Supreme Court failed
to incorporate satisfactorily significant elements of the four frameworks
of analysis that have been discussed above. And by insisting that
freedom of religion and constitutional rights in general could have no
impact on an understanding of best interests, the Court refused to
consider the role the Charter might play with respect not only to the
access parent's religious rights, but also to the scope of custodial
authority, the claims of religious communities, and the rights of children.
The requisite guidance for lower courts to be able to resolve custody and
religion disputes, in keeping with the significance of the related issues to
a liberal, democratic, diverse state, is not apparent.
This critique is not meant to suggest, however, that there is a
unified way in which the Supreme Court of Canada failed to articulate
these questions and their interconnections. Rather, as we have seen, two
distinct directions are taken by the Court, embodied in the reasons for
judgment offered by McLachlin and L'Heureux-Dub6 JJ., and each
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displays its own particular gaps and risks, especially when assessed in
light of the alternative frameworks set out above. McLachlin J.
encourages an access parent's involvement in the religious upbringing of
children, subject to a harm-based best interests test. In doing so, she
draws Canadian courts into three general difficulties. First, as we have
seen, the consequences of merely extending the power to direct religious
upbringing to the realm of visitation are problematic: a split between
physical and spiritual custody may occur, and courts may find themselves
intruding to a greater and greater extent into the day-to-day life of
parents and children. Second, the potential for disruption and instability
of custody is significant, and courts need to be aware of the impact on
custody (and, usually, custodial mothers) of arguments for unlimited
access based on religious freedom. Third, the meaning of "harm" and
the circumstances under which it should affect custody or access are far
from clear-cut.1 22 McLachlin J. does not articulate what she perceives as
harmful and thus contrary to children's best interests. That is, the
religious teachings themselves might be "harmful;" the type of religious
community at stake might be understood to produce "harm;" serious
conflict between religious beliefs of parents might itself be "harmful"
enough to satisfy McLachlin J. Limits on the basis of harm require
careful steering between acknowledgement of their negative impact on
the religious community and the responsibility of the state to protect
children, and McLachlin J. does not offer particularly clear or helpful
directions.
L'Heureux-Dub6 J., on the other hand, holds fast to the primary
significance of custody and the authority that accompanies it, subject to
children's best interests. According to her, best interests are served
when the best possible arrangements are made on behalf of children;
thus, the court's task is to enforce, and perhaps even construct, such
arrangements. Again, potential problems, evident in light of the
preceding consideration of alternative analytical frameworks, are left
unaddressed. First, in rejecting an "absence of harm" test which would
allow for limits on religious activity during access only if there were
evidence of harm, L'Heureux-Dub6 J. insists that children need not live
with negative situations just because they are barely better than
"harmful." And yet, like McLachlin J., she avoids explaining what harm
means; further, it is unclear what constraints, if any, exist on the task of
ordering the best possible arrangements for children. Second, courts are
told to discount arguments based on religious freedom, although those
122 1 do not mean to suggest that a clear definition of harm is easy or even possible. See "The
Youngest Members," supra note 86.
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arguments, as we have seen, could bolster the custodial parent's position
in a way, it would seem, to which L'Heureux-Dub6 J. would be
amenable. Finally, the specific contours of an interfaith
family-including the connections between children and the religious
communities with which they grow up-don't appear to inform Justice
L'Heureux-Dub6's notion of best interests to an adequate extent.
The presumption found in McLachlin J.'s reasons in favour of
unlimited access in the sphere of religious beliefs and activities seems to
be reversed by L'Heureux-Dub6 J. Neither provides strong justification
for her position rooted in the best interests of "interfaith children." If it
were clear which of these two judges-one of whom has the majority in
Young, the other in P. (D.)-set the stage for further resolutions of
custody and access disputes in which religion plays a role, we could focus
on that particular judgment as we move from the question of various
perspectives and the models they inspire to that of best interests.
However, confusion at the level of interpretation adds to the difficulties
in understanding and applying what each judge says. Perhaps, then, it is
preferable to understand these as essentially an interlocked pair of
majority positions, and to concentrate on the task of extracting valuable
parts of each.
As we have seen, the question of how to acknowledge and
balance the different interests at stake demands that the analytical
approaches inspired by those interests be constructed and assessed.
With this project completed we can move on to the meaning of best
interests of children, taking into account elements of the alternative
frameworks considered. By drawing on the perspectives embodied in
those frameworks, and on the sometimes buried guidelines that can be
pulled from the Supreme Court of Canada, the meaning of a "best
interests" test that can justify limited access or full access, full custody or
limited custody, can be explored. By focusing on the identity and
integrity of children in the following discussion, I try to redefine
elements of "best interests" and "absence of harm" in a child-centred
approach informed by family law principles, constitutional rights, and an
understanding of the state as made up of diverse faiths and cultures.
This enriched analysis of the task of courts in resolving custody and
access disputes involving religion, is meant, in turn, to inform a more
fruitful investigation of the relationship of the Charter to the family.
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IV. INTERESTS OF IDENTITY AND INTEGRITY
A. Elements of a Court's Assessment
A court confronted with the issue of allocation or structuring of
custody and access, complicated by religious conflict, may perceive its
task as one of investigating the custody and access arrangements that are
best for the children involved, or as one of protecting those children
from potential or actual danger. Regardless of its characterization, that
court's role includes a consideration of children's interests of identity
and integrity. These are not new concerns, although an attempt to
extract and define them may be. That is, both family law and
constitutional law frameworks, with their traditional ways of inserting
children into the analysis through "best interests" or "harm," have made
and continue to make room-albeit implicitly-for an assessment and
balancing of needs and assertions based on identity and integrity of
children. The perspectives of religious communities and child members
of those communities are integrated in this way into a court's
decisionmaking in custody disputes involving religion,123 and, subject to
explicit critique and guidance, this should continue to be the case. In the
following discussion, I attempt io uncover some of the assumptions
about identity and integrity of children made by courts, and to sketch
criticisms and suggestions drawn from the earlier analysis of alternative
approaches to the issues. In doing so, I turn to specific cases as
examples. Religion and custody situations are often unique, and the
cases chosen below are not indicative in a comprehensive way of the
state of the law;124 however, they form the basis for general observations
and guidelines.
123 See "Racial and Cultural Issues," supra note 16 at 25, where the author suggests that the
interests of community or religious groups or parents may be "masked" behind the "best interests"
criterion. Rather than reading this as potential conflict, I would ask how community or parental
interests can inform the analysis of a child's best interests.
124 Although I will draw on some Canadian examples in this discussion, I do not pretend to
offer extensive coverage of the case law and direct the reader to Religion and Culture, supra note 14;
Toselli,supra note 16; Mucci, supra note 16; Zemans, supra note 16; and "Riding the Fences," supra
note 16.
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B. The Meaning of Identity and Integrity
If courts can be understood to respond to two sets of
interests-those of identity and integrity-vested in children, initial
working definitions of those interests are necessary. More complex and
satisfactory definitions are continuing or evolving in nature, however.
That is, the exploration of the interaction of identity and integrity
interests in concrete contexts, and the way they are inserted into judicial
decisionmaking, will fill out the contours of these concepts. For the
purposes of that exploration, I offer the following sketch of children's
developing identities and sense of integrity, and the clusters of interests
they foster.
1. Identities of children
The notion of identity interests generally refers to a child's
belonging to a community or communities. The significance of identity
interests is premised on the idea that children develop a sense of identity
as they grow and that connections with individuals and groups inform
that identity. This is not to say that children have no identity when
born-indeed, their right to an identity in the form of a name and
nationality, for example, is fundamental] 2S-but it is to assert that
meaningful affiliations during childhood contribute to a personal sense
of self which may of course continue to change and develop through
adulthood. Those affiliations, with parents, siblings, teachers, friends, or
with communities based on, for example, religion, culture, language, or
ethnicity, interact with each other to create a complex web within which
the child's identity evolves. 126 Children's interests of identity are not
125 See, for example, Rights of the Child, supra note 4, arts. 7,8.
126 That is, a child goes through a process of "becoming" or "developing" in life (although
more obvious in childhood, this ongoing process is also lived by adults). See Zemans, supra, note 16
at 151 (for a discussion of culture in light of the emphasis on stability and continuity for a child
found in J. Goldstein, A. Freud & A.J. Solnit, Before the Best Interests of the Child (New York: Free
Press, 1979) at 9):
[A] child's lifestyle is a function of the cultural environment in which the child develops; a
child does not grow up in a cultural vacuum. A child has, in addition to a set of
recognizable individuals who surround him, a set of habits, beliefs and perceptions which
all reflect the particular cultural climate in which that child is developing.
Relevant to this discussion of identity is the issue of sexual orientation. Participants in
workshops or conferences in which I have presented my ideas have asked whether a parallel might
be drawn between parental religious identity "passed on" to children, and parental affiliation to gay
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predicated on individual choice: for example, a child can belong to a
community prior to choosing that membership. This is not to be
confused with an assertion that a person's identity is determined or fixed
by the community into which she was born or in which she was brought
up; instead connections are crucial to developing asense of self that in
turn incorporates the ability to choose whether to strengthen, adjust or
indeed sever those connections. 127
From this starting point, some general comments can be made
with respect to religious identity of children. These are related, of
course, to the earlier discussion of a child's perspective with respect to
religion and custody, and the ways in which that perspective is not ideally
captured by the language of rights. Usually, a child's connections to a
religion are forged through her parents, often according to the precepts
or norms of the religion itself. Again, this is not to say that the child
necessarily retains that identity throughout life, but, as noted above,
there is usually no question that parents may include their children in
religious practice. Indeed, some of those practices may be solely
concerned with children. It should be noted that the handing down of
religious identity need not involve any ceremony, practice, or, indeed,
belief on the part of the parent. That is, the rules of the religious
community may dictate the child's membership regardless of the parent's
behaviour.1 28 The state also recognizes the child's membership, albeit
implicitly, when it refrains from interference with the parents' passing on
of their religion.1 29
In the case of an interfaith marriage or partnership, parents
generally come to some agreement as to the religious upbringing and
between parental identity and the child's identity differs. That is, while a Catholic parent might say,
"I insist my child be Catholic," a lesbian parent, while obviously invested in insuring that her child
relate to, and even feel part of, a lesbian community, would not be likely to say "I insist my child be
lesbian." That is, the sense of intergenerational transmission of religious faith and belonging is not
easily analogized.
127 This is more fully discussed in "The Youngest Members," supra note 86.
128 See K.L. Karst, "Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Identity" (1986) 64
N.C. L. Rev. 303 at 307, suggesting that a child "comes to belong" through the process of
socialization and, at 308, that "from childhood we insist on our labels and could not do without
them."
129 Non-interference with, or "accommodation" of, religion in this sense forms part of the
state's protection of human rights-i.e., the state's prohibition on baptism, or circumcision, for
example, would be seen as an infringement of the individual human rights of parents and, perhaps,
of children, and a blow to the religious community in question.
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identity of their children.!30 They may agree to raise their child with one
religious identity, with some combination of both, or with none at all.
That agreement may clash with the teachings or norms of one or both
religious communities, but attracts no interference from the state. Thus,
children's identities may be non-religious, mono-religious or bi-religious,
and, in certain imaginable circumstances, might even be poly-religious.
Prior to or upon divorce, however, any agreement that existed between
interfaith parents may break down. The court's decision with respect to
custody and access thus potentially carries with it substantial
implications for the religious identity or identities of the children. That
is, the court, in effect, may uphold or alter the earlier agreement, and
thus may play a part in forming, sustaining or changing the religious
identity of children.
As the reader must surely and rightly remark, the role of courts
does not include the raising of children. And yet, the element of religion
in custody decisionmaking allows courts to have an impact on identity
formation by putting in question the links between the child, each
parent, and each religious community involved. The allocation of
custody and access, and any terms limiting the exercise of either, may
shape the religious identity of a child, rendering her mono-religious or
bi-religious. Courts thus hold the potential power to enforce a certain
identity of the child in question, while blocking other possible identities
for that same child.31
2. Children's integrity
The integrity interests of children refer to the protection of their
bodies, minds, and spirits from harm or damage. Such damage is
understood to have a negative impact on children's development and
dignity, and is thus contrary to their interests, needs, and perhaps rights.
A full description of the integrity of children, whether physical,
psychological, emotional or spiritual, and the role of courts in protecting
that integrity, is clearly beyond the scope of this project. Instead, the
context of custody disputes involving religion directs a discussion of the
integrity interests of children in relation to their identity interests. At
130 This may involve making a promise before a religious leader to raise their children in that
religion before being married, as in the case of Catholicism. That is, pre-marriage meetings of
Catholic and non-Catholic partners include discussion and commitment with respect to bringing up
the children as Catholics.
131 It is rare that such power is explicitly acknowledged.
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least in this context, the interests of identity and integrity inform each
other and, indeed, become interdependent.13 2 That is, the child's
development thrives on connections that enrich her identity and, at the
same time, depends on protection from damage or harm.
Not only are the identity and integrity interests of children
characterized by fluid interactions but the definition of integrity itself is
influenced by identity. Thus, relationships that damage the integrity of a
child cannot be justified by that child's identity interests: membership in
a community, or involvement in identity-related practices or beliefs, does
not eliminate a concern for the dignity of the child. Conversely,
however, identity interests can and do play a role in defining children's
integrity and deserve to be considered in any assessment of harm to the
child. The identity or identitites of a child accordingly insert themselves
into the decisionmaking process as to whether a certain custody and
access arrangement is damaging to a child.
The way in which the definition of integrity interests may be
affected by that of identity interests in the circumstances of a given child,
underlines the shifting and complex nature of any definition of harm to
children and the need for protection. In the context of religion and
custody disputes, we have seen that "best interests" of children, and
"harm" to children-both broadly concerned with the integrity of
children-are not understood or applied in a concrete or consistent way.
Indeed, even within a constitutional law framework according to which
guaranteed rights of parents are explicitly limited by any related harm to
the children, courts move between demanding substantial evidence of
present harm before denying or restricting custody and access, and
asking only for indications of potential harmful effects. Inevitably linked
to the values and perspectives on children found in law (and society
more generally), the notion of children's integrity shifts over time and
across value structures.133
Here, I want to focus briefly on the implications of the non-fixed
meaning of harm for the relationship between identity and integrity
interests of a child affected by a religion and custody dispute. It is
precisely over the question of integrity that the state (represented by the
court) and religious communities (generally represented by parent
132 This may be, and probably is, true in a general sense when we investigate issues relating to
children, whether they relate to custody, adoption, or welfare and protection. Here, however, I
focus on the interrelationship of identity and integrity of children in the specific context of custody
disputes in which religion plays a significant role.
133 See "The Youngest Members," supra note 86; and L Gordon, Heroes of their Own Lives
(New York: Penguin, 1980).
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members) may clash. As already discussed, a denial of custody or the
imposition of restrictions on religious practice during access, may be
interpreted as a critique of a given religious community. Thus,
consideration of identity interests of children may be welcomed by
religious communities, while the concurrent consideration of integrity
interests might be perceived as threatening to those same communities.
After all, one can imagine instances in which protection or restoration of
a child's integrity might dictate the end-or non-beginning-of the
child's membership in a community. At the same time, however,
integrity interests can coincide with identity interests: breaking apart
valuable affiliations with a community clearly holds the potential for
damaging the integrity of the child.134
Insisting on a consideration of children's integrity interests,
despite the risk of "attacking" a religious community with its own set of
interests in the outcome of a religion and custody dispute, does not
shield the courts' assessment of integrity in these cases from criticism.
Parental difference itself, and the confusion or resentment in the child
that may accompany that difference, can become too easily synonymous
with "harm," too easily diagnosed as contrary to "best interests." While
divisive conflict can be damaging to integrity, the earlier sketch of
identity suggests that a bi-religious upbringing might be possible for a
child. In addition, the response to integrity interests tends to be the
eradication or restriction of damaging situations or behaviours. Factors
that foster the integrity of a child-for example, a stable relationship
between custodial parent and child-may already be present, however,
and should be reinforced in response to the demands of this set of
interests.
C. Responding to Identity and Integrity Interests in the Analysis
Given the dynamic and difficult relationship between children's
identity and integrity, and the consequences that flow from their
recognition and balancing, making a choice between the two sets of
interests might seem an attractive option. That is, it would be easier if
we could decide which was more important in a child's life, and then
make custody and access decisions based on either group-based identity,
or individual-focused integrity. And yet, as the following discussion will
134 ConsiderRobichaud, supra note 83, a case in which custody was awarded to the father over
a mother living in a religious institution. Reasons for finding a conflict between identity and
integrity in this case were not clearly articulated.
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attempt to show, courts do grapple with the interaction of these two
notions: their responsibility includes assessment of, and reaction to, the
identities and integrity of children of interfaith parents.135 As was noted
at the start of this sketch of what I mean by these sets of interests, the
definitions are provided on an ongoing basis, derived from the situations
that come before courts for resolution.
A valuable illustration of the way in which children's identity and
integrity interests might be incorporated can be derived from the
American case of Zummo.136 While the critique of the court's emphasis
on parental rights in this case is valid, the court's decision can be reread
and justified on other grounds. First, in Zummo, the three young
children had been attending Jewish religious school and were part of the
Jewish community in a concrete way. This did not change. The children
continued those connections to their community, most specifically as a
result of their court-ordered ongoing religious school attendance on
Sunday mornings. In this way, the decision of the court could be taken
as an acknowledgement of the identity interests of the children. Second,
the court ruled that the Zummo children could occasionally accompany
their father to Catholic church services during periods of access. Rather
than being interpreted as the satisfaction of the father's constitutional
rights, the decision reflects the complex, yet real, identities of these
children; further, especially in light of the clearly marked continuation of
Jewish identity for the children, the decision indicates a reluctance to see
multiple influence as contrary to the integrity interests of those children.
Third, the fact that the Zummo children were to continue their Jewish
education and affiliation to the Reform Jewish community to which their
mother belonged, can be seen to underline the significant contribution
of a stable relationship with a custodial parent to the children's interests
of integrity.
This brief outline of an alternative way of reading and
understanding the custody and access resolution in Zummo introduces
three key concerns with respect to the way in which identity and integrity
interests are integrated, albeit implicitly, into a court's analysis. The
following discussion of these three areas does not exhaust the
possibilities for a full exploration of the handling by courts of children's
identities and integrity. But it does offer important guidelines derived
135 See C.E. Schneider, "Discretion, Rules, and Law: Child Custody and the UMDA's Best-
Interest Standard" (1991) 89 Mich. L Rev. 2215, on the subject of judicial discretion with respect to
custody decisions.
13 6 Supra note 17.
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from the alternative frameworks set out earlier and articulates risks
associated with attempts to address these sets of interests.13 7
1. Life patterns versus determination of "real" identity
One way in which courts may attempt to acknowledge and
respond to the identity interests of children is by relying on expert
evidence as to "real" identity or membership in a given religious
community. The Ontario case of Elbaz v. Elbaz38 provides a good
example. Like Zummo, the situation was that of an interfaith
Jewish-Christian relationship. Here, however, the man was an Orthodox
Jew and the woman a non-practising Catholic who converted to Judaism
prior to marriage. Upon divorce, the parents went to court in order to
resolve the issue of custody allocation. Religious identity appears to
have been a key factor for the judge in determining that the father
should retain custody. Relying on expert evidence of the rabbi of an
Orthodox Jewish congregation in Ottawa, the court found the children,
aged ten and six, to be Jewish. Thus, given that the father was a
committed, practising Orthodox Jew who wanted his children to "live
their lives in the same spirit,"139 while the mother, although Jewish by
conversion, was not "committed totally to every aspect of the orthodox
way of life," 140 custody was awarded to the father.141
From the perspective of the Orthodox Jewish community,
represented by the father, the approach taken by the court may appear
particularly welcome. The court's readiness to acknowledge and apply
religious norms reflects an appreciation of the connections between the
13 7 See Zemans, supra note 16 at 140:
What is needed and what must be elucidated is a set of guiding principles which enable
the judiciary to make consistent and predictable custodial determinations in as many
situations as possible in which diverse cultural values come into contact and conflict....
Such a set of principles may be no more than general guidelines. It would be difficult to
prescribe specific, exhaustive criteria for dealing family law issues which involve cultural
conflict.
138 (1980), 29 O.R. (2d) 207 (H.C.J.) [hereinafter Elbaz].
139 Ibid. at 218.
140 Ibid.
141 While custody appears to have been decided based largely on these observations, other
factors also play a role in the judge's decision. That is, the fact that the wife had undergone an
abortion without informing her husband (albeit in the midst of great marital turmoil), thus acting
contrary to his wishes and Orthodox Jewish beliefs and values (again testified to by the rabbi), and
that she travelled a considerable amount for her academic work, also contributed to the custody
allocation.
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children in question and the Jewish community in which their religious
identity is formed. And yet, as the earlier discussion of a community-
based framework of analysis indicated, we should be wary of what
amounts to the imposition by a secular court of a religious identity and
lifestyle on children, based on a monolithic definition that cannot
accommodate interfaith reality. This is not to say that the child of an
interfaith partnership should not be allowed to be "mono-religious." It
is to ingist, however, that, rather than turning to the expert evidence
offered by a representative of the religious community in question, the
court should look for patterns in a child's life that indicate the
development of significant identity interests that should be respected.14 2
The custody and access arrangement in Zummo could be interpreted in
this way: despite the fact that the court refused to explicitly find any
"personal religious identity"143 on the part of the Zummo children, their
father's obligation to ensure that they attended Jewish religious school in
keeping with their upbringing, responded to their past and ongoing
involvement in their religious community. In contrast to Elbaz, the
court's (implicit) appreciation of the children's identity had absolutely
nothing to do with deference to religious doctrine dealing with who is a
Jew or what conduct is compatible with being Jewish.
In Elbaz, the court could easily have focused on the way in which
these particular children had been living their lives as members of their
family and of the Orthodox Jewish community, rather than referring to
rabbinical testimony as to the way in which Orthodox Jewish children
should be raised. Indeed, the conclusion in Elbaz may have been roughly
the same if the pattern in the children's lives had been the basis for
extracting an identity interest. That is, in this case, the preferred
approach to the question and significance of children's identity does
coincide with the claims of the religious community. However, by paying
attention to the patterns of upbringing, the court would have avoided the
risks of deferring to the religious community in the allocation of custody.
The less Orthodox mother may well have been granted custody and,
even if not, the court would have been more flexible in setting out the
parameters of her access to the children.1 44
142 This is analogous to Zemans' emphasis on the principles of stability and cultural
continuity.
143 Zummo, supra note 17 at 1148.
144 See Zemans, supra note 16 at 155, on the subject of Elbaz. Zemans says the court should
have explained its reasons and characterizes the access regime as "unmanageable and
unenforceable."
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In their efforts to respect identity interests, then, courts should
avoid taking on the task of labelling children as definitively belonging to
one religious community. Evidence as to the particular child's
membership in a community should be preferred to expert evidence on
the rules or normative structure of that community.1 45 Clearly, this
principle is easier to apply in a situation where there has been an
agreement between parents during the marriage as to the question of
religious upbringing of the children. Upon divorce, of course,
disagreement over the continued upbringing of the child may become
part of the custodial dispute, especially if one parent turns back to an
earlier identity or adopts a new one. The original agreement, 146
however, may have served to shape a child's sense of identity.
The scenario is somewhat different when parents have never
resolved religious differences for the purpose of raising children. That
is, parents initially may belong to the same faith, or share in general
non-observance. At some point in the marriage, or even after
separation, one parent decides to change religions or to become
extremely observant, and enthusiastically embraces new beliefs and
practices not shared and often strongly opposed by the other parent.
This was the situation in both the Young and P. (D.) appeals before the
Supreme Court of Canada. Here, the very lack of any parental
agreement contributed to the conflict itself; indeed, the newly developed
religious differences acted as a trigger for divorce. In these cases, the
"changed" parent asked for the court's help in including the children in
his religious community. That is, the appeal of each Jehovah's Witness
father can be seen as a plea for a shift in the religious identity of the
children, against a backdrop of the mother's insistence that the children
not be exposed to the father's religion.
In a situation characterized by the lack of some earlier resolution
of conflict over religious upbringing, the children's identity interests are
defined by fluctuating or still-to-be settled connections. The mere fact
of baptism in such a case, for example, may not persuade a court that a
very young child must remain "mono-religious" in keeping with that
faith. Neither is the wish of a custodial mother that her child simply be
145 This is similar to the argument Zemans makes, ibid. at 156, that courts must "determine
the focus of stability and continuity in the child's life."
146 The question of whether such an agreement is, or should be treated as, an enforceable
contract between parties to the marriage is an interesting one and can be relevant to the court's
approach. Analysis of this issue is left to another article.
1997l
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
the same as the other children she knows,147 determinative of the limits
on the access father's activities. Again, the court should avoid making a
decision based on the mere presence of a recognizable religious
community and the intense beliefs of one parent. In Elbaz, a secular
court could be understood to impose a certain religious identity on the
children by adopting the perspective of a representative of the religious
community; in both Young and P. (D.), the trial judges also enforce a
religious identity for the children, here by blocking the children's
exposure to a particular religious community. The suggestion that past
patterns of religious connections be referred to loses its strength in a
situation where one of the religious communities at stake has never been
part of the past life of either the child or the parents, and where it is the
multicultural reality of Canadian life that has led to the introduction of
that new community. In this context, it would seem that consideration of
identity interests might lean toward the children's exposure to the
different religious communities available in their lives as their identities
are developed. Thus, at the same time that the court should avoid
ordering a mono-religious identity for children, so too should it avoid
prohibiting the possibility of a bi-religious upbringing.1 48
Identities of children are significant yet malleable within the
family context. The complexity of the above scenarios indicates that
interests derived from identity alone cannot determine fully the outcome
of custody conflicts in which religion plays a part. Both Justices
McLachlin and L'Heureux-Dub6 seem to recognize this, albeit
implicitly, in their respective emphases on exposure to difference and
the meaning of custody. Indeed, these are the remaining two areas in
which guidelines to the balancing of identity and integrity interests must
be sketched. Exposure to difference combines both identity and
integrity concerns, while the impact of the meaning of custody is
primarily integrity-related.
147 See Factum of the Respondent C.S., Supreme Court of Canada, Court File No. 22296, para.
67 [unpublished] in P.(D.), supra note 9: "C'est toutes des joies de l'enfance que je veux que ma
petite en profite pareil comme nous autres on en a profitS."
148 That is, recognition of the importance of group-based identity in a child's (and adult's) life
need not lead to an essentialist understanding of identity that requires enforcement by a court.
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2. Exposure to difference and living with conflict:
considering identity and integrity together
The very existence of the phenomenon of interfaith partnership
or marriage implies the potential for the non-mono-religious upbringing
of children. As suggested above in the context of Young and P. (D.), the
exposure of children to different influences may serve their identity
interests in a society that contemplates and exemplifies the complex
overlap of communities. At the same time, exposure to different and
even conflicting sets of religious beliefs and practices might be
understood to be in keeping with the integrity interests of children.
Courts should not be too quick to find harm in the influence of two or
multiple identity-influencing sets of beliefs. Integrity is not necessarily
damaged by the influence of differing perspectives on religious faith and
upbringing. 149
This guideline to interpreting children's integrity can be gleaned
from the opinion of McLachlin J. in the Supreme Court of Canada
appeals. In both cases, she refused to accept that religious conflict
between the custodial mother and the non-custodial father--conflict
manifested in profound resistance by the mother to the Jehovah's
Witness beliefs and teachings of the father-justified limits on the
father's behaviour during access. Indeed, in adhering to her "harm"
standard, McLachlin J. resisted any speculation as to the potentially
negative impact on children of exposure to different messages, one of
which is insistently pious in tone while the other strongly denies the
value of the religious faith embodied in the first.
While exposure to different religious perspectives might result in
confusion and resentment, and the complexity of the situation may at
times be painful, all occasionally difficult disagreement between parents
cannot be litigated or eliminated in a divorce context. Again, Zummo
can be instructive in this regard. It is probably not easy for the Zummo
children to be Jewish and yet occasionally to accompany their Italian
Catholic father to Church on Sundays, albeit-or especially-after
Jewish religious school. Neither religious community involved would
view the situation as ideal, and the religious upbringing of the children
as Jews is obviously complicated by any involvement in their father's
149 See Religion and Culture, supra note 14 at 89-91. See also "Religion and Custody," supra
note 5 at 901. Schneider warns against the risks of turning to psychologists and psychiatrists for
evaluations and argues that courts are poorly situated for gathering and analyzing evidence with
respect to conflicts. Further, at 903, he states: "[Elven if a court correctly analyzes a child's plight,
we may doubt that it will often be able to remedy it."
19971
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
faith and culture. Courts, however, must be wary of the implications of
an order that prohibits exposure to the beliefs and practices of a parent
to whom the children have access. Integrity interestS cannot demand
that the real-life consequences of interfaith families be muffled by
courts.
This understanding of integrity and identity interests combined is
strengthened if we compare the result in Zummo with that in Elbaz. In
the Ontario case, the judge explicitly shared the father's anxiety over the
prospect of the children occasionally spending week-ends with their
maternal grandparents in Montreal and thus being "deprived of the
fulfilment of the Shabbat and in lieu thereof [being] exposed to activities
which are the antithesis of the Shabbat."s0 Further, he ordered that,
during periods of access, the mother ensure that the children eat kosher
food, observe the Sabbath as far as possible, and "avoid exposing the
children to influences that are in conflict with orthodox Jewish spiritual
values."151 Indeed, the judge appeared to chastise her for taking the
children on a summer holiday to Prince Edward Island, where there was
no synagogue and thus no possibility of religious observance. 152
The underlying assumption here appears to be that identity-
based restrictions on parental behaviour will protect the integrity of the
children. And yet, such restrictions can often be characterized as
unnecessary. Exposure to'the influences of relatives of different faiths
can be seen as simply reflective of the reality of particular family
situations in which children grow up, and accompanying parents to
occasional religious services, listening to their opinions, learning about
their faith, need not destroy a strong sense of identity on the part of
children. Neither need it produce conflict to the extent that children's
interests are seriously damaged.
While this approach serves as a general guideline with respect to
parental religious difference, there are situations in which conflict is
irreconcilable. For example, religion may constitute a complete "way of
life" for one parent, while it may be insignificant or at least less intense
for the other.153 Bi-religious influence may not be acknowledged by
1 5 0 Elbaz, supra note 138 at 219.
151 Ibid. at 220.
152 Not only does this order adopt a simplistic approach to identity, but it can be criticized
from a feminist perspective focused on the role to which the mother in this case is assigned.
153 It is important to recall that the issue of access, not of custody allocation, is at stake here;
that is we can imagine situations in which custodial religious identity makes no space for multiple
influences. Remember, we are talking here about the problem of access, not whether courts could
take this into account in allocating custody.
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either parent; indeed it may seem impossible particularly from the
perspective of the "way of life" parent. In such a situation, a court's
permission for children to be exposed to the religious beliefs and
practices of each parent, whether during custody or access, may simply
be unworkable. It becomes imperative to look further for ways in which
to articulate the integrity interests of children.154 Below, I suggest that
the relationship between the custodial parent and the children must be
factored into the analysis. The family law framework in which custodial
authority figures so prominently thus can be fruitfully incorporated into
the assessment of identity and integrity interests of children.
3. Custody and what counts as harmful
Children's well-being after divorce is influenced to a great extent
by their custodial parent and her exercise of authority. As insisted upon
by L'Heureux-Dub6 J. in the two Supreme Court of Canada appeals, the
scope of custody must be wide enough to carry out the significant
responsibilities which attach to custody. For her, the decisionmaking
power of the custodial parent is intimately connected to the welfare of
the children1S5 such that substantial interference with that power,
whether or not religious in nature, cannot be consistent with "best
interests." In the present analysis of the identity and integrity interests
of children underlying judges' decisionmaking in cases of religious
conflict, the relationship between the custodial parent and the children is
crucial to the assessment of integrity. Situated in this way, appreciation
of custodial authority and the related integrity interests of children may
trump identityr-related factors and may indeed create new identities for
children.
The integrity-related significance of the relationship between
children and their custodial parent can also be derived from Zummo as
the third element of a revised interpretation of the judgment. That is,
the fact that the Zummo children were to continue their Jewish religious
school training and affiliation to the Jewish community to which their
mother belonged, corresponds to the appropriate scope of custody.
While the order forcing the father to ensure the childen's attendance at
Jewish religious school during periods of access is not, on its face,
154 For example, it has been suggested that the custodial parent's understanding of religious
identity include a willingness to exhibit "tolerance" (Religion and Culture, supra note 14 at 85-89) if
it is not be found "harmful" to the child, but I am unconvinced as to the potential for such a test.
155 P. (D.), supra note 9 at 166-74.
1997]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
consistent with his otherwise acknowledged desire to share his own
religion, it can nevertheless be justified by the interests of the children in
living according to their mother's authority as to religious upbringing.
An Ontario case illustrates the problems attached to the
violation of this general principle and, indeed, combines the concerns
articulated with respect to both identity and integrity analysis. In
Avitan,156 the husband was an Orthodox Jew and the wife a Pentecostal
Christian who converted to Judaism not for "any deep religious
commitment," according to the court, but rather because she was "a
pragmatic soul who determined that it was in her best interest ... if she
wanted to marry Meir."157 Custody of, and access to, their five-and-a-
half-year-old son, Daniel, was at issue. The parents lived together only
for a few months after the marriage, during which Daniel was born.
They then separated, at which time the mother had the baby christened
at the Pentecostal Church. According to a later agreement between the
two, the child was to be raised by his mother as a Jew. However, the
mother recommenced her involvement in the Pentecostal church; in
response, the father kidnapped Daniel to Israel at one point, only to be
ordered back to Toronto.
Given this confused and antagonistic situation, the judge found,
based on expert Orthodox rabbinical evidence, that "Daniel was born a
Jew and will remain such all his life no matter what religious training he
receives during his life."158 Quoting the rabbi as saying that "[t]o every
Jew, his child is the apple of his eye,"159 the judge ruled that Daniel
should "understand what it means to be a Jew" and that this was not
possible "without the guidance and care and teaching of his father."1 60
While custody was awarded to the mother who had been primarily
responsible for the care of Daniel since his birth, the father was granted
structured access, including the power to arrange for religious day school
education.
Here, then, the fact that the child was explicitly found to be a Jew
did not determine custody, but it did dictate the details of the
custody/access arrangement. While the judge ascertained the "real"
religious identity of the child, he had no trouble with the child being
Jewish and being brought up by a non-Jewish parent. Indeed, despite
156 Supra note 91.
1571bid. at 385.
1 5 8 Ibi.
159 Ibid. at 384.
160 Ibid. at 402.
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what appears to be the essence of this child's character as found by the
court, the custodial mother was explicitly permitted to take the child
with her to the Pentecostal church. At first glance, this approach seems
consistent with the guidelines sketched above. Although his deference
to religious authority can be criticized, the judge accepts that the parent
with primary responsibility for upbringing of the children need not be
the person who is "truly" or "more observantly" a member of the
religious community in which the child was brought up during the
marriage. Further, he attempts to respect both sets of religious beliefs
by handing responsibility over Jewish education and upbringing to the
access father, while at the same time recognizing that Daniel would be
exposed to the Pentecostal faith of his mother.
In this case, however, the excessive conflict between, and past
actions undertaken by the parents, suggest that a bi-religious upbringing
is not a real possibility. By ordering that the custodial mother defer to
the access father on issues of religious observance and, more
importantly, on issues of education in general, the court allowed the
continued exercise of excessive power by the father over the mother.
Instead of being quick to allocate substantial authority to the access
father, especially given the history of religion-based intractable conflict
between the parents, the court should have taken more seriously the
necessary authority attached to custody. In this case, that might mean
that Daniel would be brought up outside the Jewish faith. While tragic
from the perspective of both the Orthodox Jewish community and the
father, this is a situation where integrity interests trump those of identity
voiced by a parent and his religious community.1 61
Integrity that incorporates the relationship between custodial
parent and child can also be understood to direct the formation of new
identity interests. In the case of B. (L.) v. C.(J),162 decided by the
Quebec Court of Appeal, a Jehovah's Witness mother was granted
custody. The combination of custody and religious belief would seem to
suggest the development of a Jehovah's Witness religious identity for the
child. At the request of the access father, however, restrictions were
imposed on the custodial mother's religious activities. Door-to-door
161 Note here that the decision of the court with respect to custody does not change the fact
that Daniel is Jewish from the community's point of view. But, although the community's
understanding of membership may be considered with respect to identity interests, the Avitan
situation illustrates the possible desirability of a custody and access decision being made in a way
that shifts the child's identity into line with the custodial parent's religious affiliation.
162 (1991), 91 D.L.R. (4th) 27 [hereinafter B. (L.)].
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visits "seemed to upset the child"163 and this negative, yet nebulous,
effect of the mother's religious practices was deemed sufficient to
warrant court-ordered limits on her behaviour. While the court thus
appears to take integrity interests into account in making the order, the
link between custodial authority and integrity is not considered. If
incorporated into the analysis in the manner suggested here, that link
would have demanded that any damage to integrity derived from
religious beliefs and practices would have to outweigh the integrity
interests served by the consistent authority of the custodial parent with
respect to the religious upbringing of the children.164 According to such
an analysis, restrictions on the custodial mother in B. (L.) would likely be
found unjustified. By extending the scope of integrity beyond a
substantial threat of physical or mental harm to include the significance
of custody, children's religious identity might be allowed to evolve in a
way very different from that desired by the access parent.165
In considering restrictions on access, courts can and should
acknowledge the possiblity of difference between parents in their
religious beliefs and communities. They therefore cannot stop
discussions or the taking of children to services; indeed they respond to
children of interfaith partnerships by refraining from imposing such
limits. On the other hand, a non-custodial parent cannot undermine the
primary responsibility for upbringing held by the custodial parent, for
example by dictating education, diet or lifestyle of children not in his
care. That is, the link between custodial authority and integrity means
that a non-custodial parent's assertion of a self-perceived right to pass
on religion or enforce a monolithic religious identity on children or
exclude other religious influences, all to the detriment or undermining of
the custodial parent, carries the potential for damaging children's
integrity interests.!66 Such an extreme situation is unusual and should be
163 Ibid. at 37.
164 This is similar to what the American Uniform Manriage and Divorce Act § 408, 9A U.L.A.
561 (1996 Supp.) suggests: courts are not to intervene with the authority (and religious practices) of
the custodial parent unless there is actual harm involved such that the child's physical health or
emotional development is endangered.
165 This does not assume that children do not voice their own preferences or choices; indeed
the custodial parent is subject to children's decisions and behaviour the same way as any other
parent.
166 This differs from the strict pro-custody approach embodied in Strum v. Strum (1973), 8
R.F.L. 140 at 144 (N.S.W.S.C.). In this case, the Roman Catholic mother had custody while the
Jewish father was prevented from teaching his religion to the children: "There could not be other
than discord engendered in the [custodial parent's] household if she were to be compelled to
acquiesce in the children committed to her care being brought up in a faith to which she profoundly
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understood as such.167 However, if a non-custodial parent's sharing of
beliefs and practices does operate in this way, then restraints may be
justified. Similarly, a court should be extremely slow to impose restraints
on a custodial parent's religious beliefs and practices at the behest of an
access parent: the allocation of custody should carry with it the full
exercise of its scope.
D. The Interactions of Identity and Integrity
In drawing attention to how courts take identity and integrity
interests of children into account in custody decisionmaking, I am not
calling for an explicit tally of these interests in every case. Instead, I
have tried to uncover what "best interests" and "harm" might mean in
the context of divorce-related disputes over religious upbringing. Judges
called upon to untangle the complicated situations that these cases
present have an impact on the identity and integrity of children,
regardless of whether those interests are explicitly named or
acknowledged. In exercising their power and discretion in this way,
judges indicate the contours of the state's perspective on religion and
custody and its response to the significance of the attached issues.168
The interactions of identity and integrity, illustrated by the three
general guiding principles sketched above, draw from, and hold
implications for, all of the analytical frameworks proposed. From the
family law framework, we find an emphasis on custodial authority and
stability within a post-divorce family. From the constitutional law
framework, we find respect for the guarantee of freedom of religion and
an associated rejection of the state's determination of the definition of
true religious beliefs and practices. Further, there is a recognition of the
objects." As should be clear, this is an exclusionary and extremely problematic framework.
167 See, for example, the recent "witch" case from Alberta-Gay v. Kingston, [1992] A.J. No.
1171 (QL) (Prov. Ct.), in which the father, an adherent of the Wicca religion, was not restricted
during access to his son. Nothing harmful was found in the father's religious practices. Note,
however, before admiring the court's acceptance of the child's exposure to a different, and indeed,
very out-of-the-mainstream, community, the fact that the father imposed limitations on himself in
testimony before the court. He said that he did not intend to pass on his religious beliefs to his son,
and would not answer questions on religion until the child was approximately twelve years old. See
also '"Witch' is entitled unsupervised access to son, Alta. judge decides" Lawyer's Weekly (22
January 1993) 3.
168 Toope in "Riding the Fences," supra note 16 at 83, characterizes the task as follows: "On
the one hand, courts should be willing to uphold the religious choices parents make in relation to
the raising of children. On the other hand, children need protection from religious beliefs and
practices which endanger their health and welfare." Toope's fundamental objective is to uphold
diversity in attitudes with respect to religion and child-rearing.
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potential for children to grow up exposed to different, and perhaps
conflicting, religious influences. From a community-based framework,
we find acknowledgement of and support for a diversity of communities,
each with interests expressed through individual parents and through
children themselves. Finally, from the perspective of children, a
balancing of identity and integrity responds to their interests as complex
individuals who are meaningful members of families and communities.
Not only can we find echoes of the frameworks derived from
different perspectives, but the interaction of identity and integrity tells us
something about resolving the tension between parental claims linked to
religion and the best interests test insisted upon by the Supreme Court
of Canada. Looking at ways in which we can and should address
children's interests in these cases actually informs the notion of
constitutional freedom of religion. Instead of denying or avoiding the
significance of freedom of religion in the context of the breakdown of an
interfaith partnership or marriage with children, we can instead
tentatively explore the meaning and extent of that freedom. That is,
while the Charter introduces freedom of religion into family law, the
relationships among members of a family that includes children, no
matter the format of that family, affect the definition and scope of any
rights claimed with respect to each other.1 69
Parental freedom of religion, in keeping with the identity and
integrity interests of children of interfaith partnerships, thus extends to
discussing beliefs with children, taking the children to religious meetings
or services, and sharing religious practices with them. At the same time,
those interests dictate that, while a child may be exposed to and
connected to different religious communities, the non-custodial parent
cannot insist on monopolizing the religious identity of the child by
"passing on" his religion in a way that undermines the primary
responsibility for upbringing held by the custodial parent or destroys the
relationship between custodial parent and child. Taking a child to
religious services during access periods is usually not an example of such
behaviour on the part of the non-custodial parent. On the other hand,
169 See Karst, supra note 128 at 357. He argues that an individual's religious liberty "includes
the freedom to develop, maintain, or modify a religious identity." See also Note, "Reinterpreting
the Religion Clauses: Constitutional Construction and Conceptions of the Self" (1984) 97 Harv. L.
Rev. 1468.
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dictating education, diet, and lifestyle is, and should not receive the
court's backing.1 70
In general, the exercise of parental freedom of religion
corresponds with the identity interests of a child whose community
membership contributes to her development and sense of self. In the
event of the breakdown of an interfaith partnership, however, when
claims of parental freedom of religion may pull in opposite directions,
the court's task is not to limit the connections a child may have to
different religious communities or to enforce a monolithic mono-
religious identity on the child at the behest of one parent. In other
words, parental freedom of religion does not operate to promise a
religious community the membership of "its" children.171 A child of an
interfaith marriage should be allowed to have a mono-religious identity,
however, in the sense that the court cannot respond to the rights claims
of the parents by trying to make the child truly bi-religious. From the
community's perspective, this translates into an implied obligation on
the part of the court not to set about to destroy communities by forcibly
severing their connections with children.172
V. CONCLUSION
The appeals before the Supreme Court attempted to pit the best
interests test against Charter freedoms in a misleading and problematic
manner.1 73 The Court, unfortunately, did not explicitly reject that
dichotomy; nor did it provide guidelines as to how parental freedoms
interact with and are shaped by the children whose identity and integrity
are thereby affected. By focusing on the interplay of identity and
170 Compare the slightly different position taken by Schneider who also stresses the limits of
courts in "Religion and Custody," supra note 5 at 904: "Courts do not have to iron out conflicts
between custodial and non-custodial parents unless those conflicts provoke behaviour amounting to
child abuse. Courts must do what courts must do; they should avoid doing what they can only do
badly."
171 See N.M. Stolzenberg & D.N. Myers, "Community, Constitution and Culture: The Case of
the Jewish Kehilah" (1992) 25 U. Mich. J. L. Ref. 633. They conclude that an autonomous legal
order cannot be fully protected within a system of state law unless, perhaps, it was extremely insular
with a very limited exposure to courts. The membership of children, however, would be one way in
which the state could defer to some extent to parallel community structures.
172 Zemans, supra note 16 at 141, articulates the "guiding notion" that "the judiciary has few
absolute values at its disposal when dealing with family law matters within a context of cultural
diversity."
173 According to Christine Davies in "Racial and Cultural Issues," supra note 16 at 21, courts
will use the Charter, to balance the rights of parents and interest groups against a child's interests.
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integrity interests, it is possible to accept that the Charter can inform
issues related to the family, especially with respect to children; equally,
however, family law should inform any analysis of the rights and
freedoms at stake.174 This assertion rejects a private picture of the
loving family, untouched by concerns of justice, 75 at the same time that
it allows for the particularities of familial connections to have an impact
on the exercise of individual rights. Custody disputes involving religion
indicate that the context of family relationships must inform the content
of any rights claimed in that context.
Courts are not ongoing monitors, however, of the development
of the identity of children; neither can they ensure children's continued
integrity. Parental respect for the identity and integrity of their children
must generally be assumed whether before or after divorce.17 6 In
making decisions concerning custody and access, however, courts do
consider, and have an impact on, identity and integrity interests. Thus,
in allocating custody, courts should grant the custodial parent primary
responsibility for the education and religious upbringing of the child.
This does not mean that custody should be allocated according to the
religious identity of the child as found or established by the court on the
basis of expert testimony. Indeed, the custodial parent and the children
need not share identical membership in a religious community. Neither
should parental affiliation with a certain religious community on its own
disqualify that parent from custody, although courts may consider the
impact of religious practices on the child's integrity. With respect to
access, children's identity and integrity interests suggest that, as a parent,
an adult may discuss, teach, and share religious beliefs and practices with
a child. Children with connections to more than one religious
community emerge from a multicultural society and their exposure to
difference within their relationships with family members should be
celebrated. These basic principles target and work to eradicate judicial
bias against unusual or non-mainstream religions and the refusal to
contemplate the coexistence of different religious communities in a
174 Further, as Zemans points out, supra note 16 at 140, cultural values are "built into the
concept of the family itself."
175 See, for example, F.E. Olsen, "The Family and the Market: A Study in Ideology and Legal
Reform" (1983) 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1497; and S. Moller Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family (New
York: Basic Books, 1989).
176 This is the case just as parents, generally, are understood to understand and serve the best
interests of their children.
[VOL. 35 No. 2
Religion, Custody, and a Child's Identities
child's life.1 77 But those principles are also enriched, complicated, and
made more reflective of the realities of children of interfaith parents,
when they are carefully applied in a way responsive to those children.
In making decisions with respect to custody and access, when
religion plays a part in the dispute, courts have an impact on each
parent, the children, and the religious communities represented by the
individuals in the courtroom. And yet, courts do not bring up children,
govern individual religious beliefs and practices, or enforce religious
doctrine and the norms of religious communities within the state.
Acceptance of these limitations should shape the task of judges even as
they are handed the responsibility for resolving custody disputes
involving religion-a responsibility that encompasses ensuring freedom
of religion in the context of custody and access, and appreciating the
identity and integrity of children. Thus, judges tread a fine line between
responding to real concerns of parents over the religious upbringing of
children, distinguishing between these and superficial attempts to justify
claims for restrictions on custody, and digging themselves deep into
unenforceable schemes ostensibly created on behalf of children, but
guaranteed to generate ongoing conflict and resentment.
A liberal society such as Canada, with a significant interfaith
marriage rate 78 accompanied by a significant divorce rate, requires an
approach to custody decisionmaking adapted to those circumstances.
Parents should know that, in general, they will not be restricted with
respect to religion in their relations with their children; they should also
be assured that the allocation of custody will not depend solely on the
religious identity of the child as found by the court. Primary or
agreed-upon religious identity of children may play a part in determining
the content of custody and access, but it should be modified by
considerations of integrity and the role of the custodial parent.
A custody conflict is usually understood to rage over a "private"
child, in a "private" family law context. And yet, the way in which the
1 77 A remaining issue is whether the Charter itself might be used to justify judicial preference
for religions and religious practices that correspond to Charter values. Mucci, supra note 16 at 360,
suggests that religious values reflecting tolerance, charity, compassion and social duty, would
thereby be favoured. It would seem that, conversely, non-Charter-like beliefs and teachings of a
particular religion might be found damaging to children. This line of reasoning appears to
undermine the religious freedom guaranteed by the Charter in the first place, but a full examination
of the issue is beyond the scope of this article.
178 Focusing on interfaith marriage is, of course, tied to liberal society, and, usually, liberal
members of that society. The guidelines I have offered would not be satisfactory to individuals who
adhere to strict non-liberal religious normative systems; and thus show the potential for both clash
and dialogue between state law in a liberal society and religious orders that perceive of themselves
as parallel frameworks.
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court takes a hand in determining post-divorce arrangements for the
child's life shows how that child is also a "public" young person or
emergent citizen. In a diverse state with citizens belonging to numerous
groups, including religious communities, the child of an interfaith
partnership presents an obvious example of the potential for overlapping
community memberships in one individual.179  The response of
Canadian courts to the reality of these Canadian children indicates, in
one small way, the response of the state to the reality of multicultural
dynamics.
179 See "La diversit6," supra note 7. The child is an emergent citizen located within multiple
normative communities or forces.
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